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567 
SMALL INVESTMENTS, BIG LOSSES:  
THE STATES’ ROLE IN PROTECTING LOCAL 




Abstract: The securities regulation landscape has changed dramatically in recent years. 
Federal laws have increasingly preempted the regulatory power of states, while at the same 
time expanding the universe of securities offerings that are not subject to registration at the 
federal level. These political and policy choices reflect a balancing of two sometimes 
competing goals: protecting investors and facilitating capital formation. While policies 
centered on preemption and deregulation might reduce the cost of raising capital, these could 
also lead to more pervasive securities fraud. Any resulting increase in fraudulent practices is 
likely to disproportionately affect small securities offerings that are local in nature, for which 
the deterrent effect of private securities litigation and public enforcement is weaker. This 
places unsophisticated and non-wealthy investors, those less capable to absorb financial 
losses, at a disproportionate risk of fraud. From a broader economic perspective, the social 
welfare implications of such fraudulent securities offerings may be significant even when the 
amounts involved in each individual transaction appear to be relatively trivial to the casual 
observer. 
This Article identifies and theorizes the under-regulation of small-scale securities 
transactions that results from the confluence of federal preemption and the weakness of 
traditional enforcement mechanisms that are better suited to large-scale fraud. This Article is 
also the first to identify and analyze the economic and policy implications of two existing 
and potential trends in state regulation that might mitigate this state of affairs. In the last two 
decades, a growing number of states have broadened the remedies available to their securities 
commissioners in administrative actions to include the ability to request or order restitution 
on behalf of injured investors. The second trend is at a more nascent stage. Recently, some 
states have experimented with public insurance-type schemes that allow defrauded investors 
to recover a portion of their losses. The renewed emphasis on compensating victims of fraud 
highlighted by these developments is encouraging, but more states should follow suit. To that 
end, this Article makes a series of normative suggestions to improve the effectiveness of 
these state legislative responses and to promote their more widespread adoption. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On March 30, 2007, the following advertisement appeared in the 
classified section of the Missoulian
1
 under the heading “Investments”: 
24% well-secured fixed 1 yr. yield w/ Go Zone trusts. 
Help rebuild booming Gulf Coasts. Terry, [phone number].
2
 
Attracted by the prospects of a twenty-four percent return, Rece 
Cobeen, a resident of Montana, responded to the ad and contacted Terry 
Parks.
3
 Between April 19, 2007, and July 15, 2008, Cobeen invested a 
total of $55,000, most of his life savings, in exchange for notes.
4
 The 
notes were not registered with any state or federal agency and Parks 
never provided Cobeen with any type of written disclosure document 
relating to the notes or Parks’s activities.5 After July 2008, Cobeen had 
become suspicious of Parks’s motives and the extraordinarily high 
interest rate that he had been promised.
6
 Cobeen contacted Parks and 
asked for his money back, but Parks refused to return the money
7
 and 
subsequently relocated to Texas.
8
 
What could Cobeen do at this point? A natural response is that he 
should look to the federal securities laws, namely the 1933 Securities 
Act (Securities Act)
9
 and the 1934 Exchange Act (Exchange Act),
10
 that 
employ various devices to protect investors from fraudulent offerings.
11
 
For example, the registration requirements of the Securities Act mandate 
the disclosure of information to investors prior to the sale of securities.
12
 
                                                     
1. MISSOULIAN, Classifieds, http://missoulian.com/ads/ (last visited May 1, 2017).  
2. State v. Parks, 310 P.3d 1088, 1089 (Mont. 2013). “Go Zone” refers to the “Gulf Opportunity 
Zone,” coastal areas in Louisiana devastated by Hurricane Katrina in August 2005. See id.  
3. Id.  
4. Id. at 1089–90. See also Press Release, Office of the Mont. State Auditor, Comm’r of Sec. & 
Ins., Hurricane Relief Scam Victim Receives Restitution (July 9, 2012), 
http://csimt.gov/news/hurricane-relief-scam-victim-receives-restitution [https://perma.cc/WT27-
YCHW]. 
5. Parks, 310 P.3d at 1090–91. 
6. Id. Cobeen had only received a $400 interest payment on June 2007. Id.  
7. Id.  
8. See Joe Nickell, Missoula Man Gets 10 Years in Prison for Illegally Selling $55K in 
Investments, MISSOULIAN (Feb. 25, 2012), http://missoulian.com/news/local/missoula-man-gets-
years-in-prison-for-illegally-selling-k/article_71a8750a-5f65-11e1-9d21-0019bb2963f4.html 
[https://perma.cc/S2DW-AXME]. 
9. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2012). 
10. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78qq (2012). 
11. See infra section I.A. 
12. See infra notes 39–40 and accompanying text. 
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Those who fail to meet these registration requirements or commit fraud 
in the materials provided to investors face liability under the Act’s 
investor-friendly civil liability provisions.
13
 
But not all securities transactions are created equal. Although the 
federal securities laws apply to all offers and sales of securities, the 
extent of regulation varies from transaction to transaction. Certain 
offerings are exempt from the registration requirements of the Securities 
Act, leaving investors with fewer protections against opportunistic 
promoters.
14
 As it turns out, many of these exemptions cover small and 
local offerings, which present a disproportionate risk of failure and 
fraud.
15
 Complicating matters further for investors like Cobeen, there has 
been a persistent trend towards increasing the number and expanding the 
scope of these exemptions.
16
 But even if Cobeen’s transaction was 
exempt from registration, Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act would likely 
afford him some protection. Rule 10b-5, the catch-all antifraud 
provision, applies to all securities transactions, whether or not they are 
exempt from the registration requirements of the Securities Act.
17
 
Determining whether he has a valid cause of action under the federal 
securities laws would be just part of Cobeen’s calculus. Bringing a 
lawsuit is a costly and risky proposition: not only would Cobeen have to 
spend additional resources in attorney fees, but he would face the 
prospect of losing the lawsuit or being unable to enforce and recover a 
judgment against Parks.
18
 This, of course, is a predicament faced by all 
defrauded investors, and various mechanisms, such as contingency fees, 
class actions, and public enforcement by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), have developed in response.
19
 Unfortunately for 
Cobeen, these mechanisms often do not work well for small, local 
transactions. Although $55,000 certainly is a substantial amount of 
money for Cobeen, it likely is not large enough to make it economically 




Cobeen could also explore state securities laws that may afford him 
protection. Registration and information disclosure requirements provide 
                                                     
13. See infra notes 41–42 and accompanying text. 
14. See infra notes 43–52 and accompanying text. 
15. See infra note 61 and accompanying text. 
16. See infra notes 53–57 and accompanying text. 
17. See infra notes 62–64 and accompanying text. 
18. See infra notes 68–69 and accompanying text. 
19. See infra notes 70–71 and accompanying text. 
20. See infra notes 102–04 and accompanying text. 
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an ex ante mechanism to weed-out, or at least alert investors to, 
fraudulent offerings.
21
 However, the prophylactic effect of these 
provisions has been blunted by federal law, which has increasingly 
preempted state registration requirements for certain offerings that are 
exempt from federal registration, leaving investors with fewer ex ante 
regulatory protections.
22
 State securities laws also contain anti-fraud 
provisions that mirror their federal counterparts.
23
 But even if Cobeen 
had a claim under state law, he would still face the costs and risk 
associated with pursuing his claim in court and enforcing his judgment 
were he to prevail. 
Cobeen ultimately filed a complaint with the Montana Commissioner 
of Securities and Insurance, who then filed an action against Parks for 
securities fraud and selling securities without registration.
24
 In October 
2011, a jury found Parks guilty and the judge imposed a ten-year 
sentence.
25
 From society’s perspective, this outcome is desirable, as it 
provides more power to the deterrent effects of the securities laws and 
discourages future fraudulent activities. But what could motivate Cobeen 
to file a complaint with the securities commissioner and cooperate with 
the investigation and trial, admitting publicly that he was taken 
advantage of in such manner? Having Parks sentenced to ten years of 
imprisonment may provide a sense of retribution for Cobeen, but it does 
not compensate him for his substantial monetary loss. In fact, with Parks 
imprisoned and unable to work, recovery in a civil action becomes an 
even more unlikely prospect. 
As it turns out, Montana law allows the state securities administrator 
to request the court to grant an order of restitution on behalf of 
defrauded investors.
26
 So, in addition to the ten-year prison term, the 
judge also ordered restitution—i.e., that Parks return to Cobeen the 
balance of his $55,000 investment.
27
 This result highlights a recent trend 
in securities regulation and the protection of small investors at the state 
level. A growing number of states have expanded the authority of their 
state securities administrators, authorizing them to request that a court 
grant restitution in favor of an injured investor even in civil actions 
                                                     
21. See infra notes 106–08 and accompanying text. 
22. See infra notes 115–17 and accompanying text. 
23. See infra note 109 and accompanying text. 
24. State v. Parks, 310 P.3d 1088, 1090–91 (Mont. 2013).  
25. Id. at 1092–93. 
26. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-10-305 (2011). 
27. See Press Release, supra note 4; Nickell, supra note 8. 
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 Many states have gone further and have 
authorized their securities administrators to order restitution as part of an 
administrative action.
29
 These regulatory innovations increase both the 
deterrent effect of state law and the likelihood of injured investors 
receiving some compensation for their losses. 
Unfortunately, the court-ordered restitution appeared to be of little 
value to Cobeen, as Parks had spent all of Cobeen’s money and was to 
be incarcerated for the near future, making payment of the $55,000 
nearly impossible. Once again, Cobeen benefitted from a recent 
innovation in states’ securities regulation. Cobeen was able to receive 
$13,750 (twenty-five percent of his losses) from the Montana Securities 
Restitution Assistance Fund, an insurance-type fund that had been 
established a few years earlier to assist victims of securities fraud who 
otherwise have no opportunity to receive restitution.
30
 
Cobeen’s story illustrates how the traditional enforcement 
mechanisms associated with federal securities regulation, which rely 
heavily on the SEC and private class action litigation, neglect a 
significant subset of transactions, namely small and local ones. Because 
registration is the preeminent mechanism for investor protection, the tilt 
towards exempting small-scale securities from registration requirements 
has created regulatory lacunae in which small investors are at great risk. 
Federal preemption can exacerbate this problem by preventing states 
from stepping into the breach and regulating the distribution and sale of 
securities.  
This under-regulation of small-scale securities transactions, which 
results from the confluence of federal preemption and existing civil 
remedies that are better suited to address large-scale fraud, is a symptom 
of a normative conflict between state and federal securities laws. State 
securities laws are “remedial in character, designed to prevent frauds and 
impositions upon the public,” and are generally liberally construed to 
protect investors.
31
 The federal securities laws, on the other hand, must 
balance the goal of protecting investors with the broader goals of 
maintaining the integrity of the national capital markets and facilitating 
                                                     
28. See infra notes 145–47 and accompanying text. 
29. See infra notes 148–63 and accompanying text. 
30. See Press Release, supra note 4; infra section II.B.1.b. 
31. King v. Pope, 91 S.W.3d 314, 323–24 (Tenn. 2002) (quoting DeWees v. State, 390 S.W.2d 
241, 242 (Tenn. 1965)). See also People v. Figueroa, 715 P.2d 680, 695 (Cal. 1986); Ratliffe v. 
Hartsfield Co., 184 S.E. 324, 327 (Ga. 1935); State v. Hawaii Mkt. Ctr., Inc., 485 P.2d 105, 109 
(Haw. 1971); State v. Coin Wholesalers, 250 N.W.2d 583, 588 (Minn. 1976).  
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 For cases of securities fraud that are national in 
scope, the allocation of power between the federal government and the 
states does not cause major problems. However, when it comes to cases 
involving small, local fraud, the preeminence of federal regulation often 
results in a system that can be highly dysfunctional. 
Although the amounts involved in these transactions may appear 
trivial (relative to the more salient cases that are of interest to the SEC, 
plaintiff’s attorneys, and the financial press), the individual losses may 
be in fact quite significant, especially if these involve a large percentage 
of the victim’s wealth.33 Thus, the social welfare implications of these 
small, but numerous, instances of fraud can be substantial and merit the 
attention of policy-makers. Regulation and enforcement at the state level 
arguably provides a superior toolset to maintain adequate deterrence and 
ensure a base level of compensation for victims in these types of 
transactions. However, since the power of the states to regulate the 
distribution and sale of securities ex ante has been significantly curtailed 
by federal legislation preempting state law, states have increasingly 
focused their efforts on ex post mechanisms to regulate these 
transactions. 
This Article identifies and analyzes the economic and policy 
implications of two important trends in state regulation and enforcement 
that have developed in response to the under-regulation problem 
described above. In the last two decades, a growing number of states 
have broadened the remedies available to their securities commissioners 
in administrative actions to include the ability to request or order 
restitution on behalf of injured investors.
34
 Although this expansion of 
                                                     
32. See U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, FISCAL YEAR 2015 SUMMARY OF PERFORMANCE & 
FINANCIAL INFORMATION 2 (2016) (“The mission of the SEC is to protect investors, maintain fair, 
orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.”); Joan MacLeod Heminway, 
Investor and Market Protection in the Crowdfunding Era: Disclosing to and for the “Crowd,” 38 
VT. L. REV. 827, 828 (2014) (stating that the “core policy objectives” of securities regulation are 
“protect[ing] investors, maintain[ing] the integrity of securities markets, and encourag[ing] capital 
formation”); Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, “Publicness” in Contemporary 
Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337, 340 (2013) (noting the trade-offs 
inherent in balancing the goals of investor protection and capital formation). 
33. And when considered in the aggregate, the amounts involved in these small transactions can 
be quite large. Although each individual offering may be small, the market for private, exempt 
securities offerings dwarfs the market for public, registered offerings. In 2014, $2.1 trillion was 
raised in 35,637 private placements. Registered offerings, on the other hand, accounted for $1.35 
trillion of new capital, raised in 2,752 offerings. See SCOTT BAUGUESS ET AL., CAPITAL RAISING IN 
THE U.S.: AN ANALYSIS OF THE MARKET FOR UNREGISTERED SECURITIES OFFERINGS, 2009–2014, 
at 6–7 (2015), https://www.sec.gov/dera/staff-papers/white-papers/unregistered-offering10-2015.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U3F6-JD6R]. 
34. See infra section II.A. 
05 - Berdejo.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/28/2017  1:51 PM 
574 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:567 
 
administrative power enhances the deterrent effect of securities laws and 
facilitates compensation for injured investors, concerns relating to 
increased costs and procedural fairness are likely preventing broader 
adoption. This Article argues that further cooperation and coordination 
among states could help address these concerns and encourage more 
states to authorize their administrators to order restitution. The second 
innovation is more recent. A few states have begun to experiment with 
insurance-type schemes that offer defrauded investors partial 
compensation for losses suffered as a result of securities violations.
35
 
These newly established restitution funds are promising, but the design 
of these programs should carefully consider likely behavioral responses 
by investors and administrators to ensure their success. This Article 
presents a series of recommendations to address these concerns and 
increase the likelihood that other states will establish their own 
restitution funds. 
More generally, this Article contributes to a number of important 
debates in the academic literature. First, it opens new avenues in 
longstanding policy discussions over the basic tension between protecting 
investors and facilitating capital formation, two fundamental goals of 
securities regulation.
36
 Second, by providing a theoretical framework to 
assess the involvement of local governments in the regulation of 
securities, this Article adds a new dimension to the literature weighing 
the optimal allocation of regulatory power among federal and state 
governments in a multijurisdictional framework.
37
 Finally, this Article is 
part of a growing literature evaluating large-scale compensation efforts 
by administrative agencies and other public actors.
38
 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I discusses the role of federal 
and state law in the regulation of the securities markets, highlighting the 
precarious position occupied by victims of small-scale fraud in this 
multi-jurisdictional framework. Part II examines and assesses the two 
recent innovations of the states in their struggle against securities fraud 
described above, underscoring their relationship to two interconnected 
goals of securities regulation: deterrence and compensation. Part III 
discusses the general implications of these developments and concludes. 
                                                     
35. See infra section II.B. 
36. See supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text. 
37. See infra section I.B.1. 
38. See infra note 172 and accompanying text. 
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I. THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF SECURITIES 
REGULATION 
This section begins with an overview of the federal regulation of 
securities markets, highlighting how small-scale fraud is unlikely to be 
pursued by public or private enforcement of federal law. The second part 
of this section focuses on state regulation and, in particular, the role of 
state administrators in regulating local securities markets and enforcing 
states’ securities laws, a topic that has received limited attention in the 
academic literature. 
A. Federal Regulation of the Securities Markets 
The federal securities laws provide a wide array of measures to 
protect investors. Under the regulatory framework of the Securities Act, 
an issuer selling securities must prepare a set of mandatory disclosure 
documents, including a registration statement, which must be filed with 
the SEC, and a prospectus, which is part of the registration statement and 
must be distributed to the investors.
39
 A sale of unregistered securities 
gives rise to Section 12(a)(1) liability, which grants investors rescissory 
rights if the securities were offered or sold in violation of the Securities 
Act’s registration requirements.40 In addition to mandating the disclosure 
of information, the Securities Act contains two civil liability provisions 
that protect investors in the event that the information contained in these 
disclosure documents is fraudulent. Section 11 of the Securities Act 
imposes liability if the registration statement contains a material 
misrepresentation,
41
 while Section 12(a)(2) provides a cause of action 
for material misstatements contained in the prospectus.
42
 
                                                     
39. The Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77z (2012), which governs the primary public offerings 
of securities by issuers, provides that, unless otherwise exempt, all offers and sales of securities 
must be registered with the SEC. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW 2–3 (Kris 
Markarian ed., 3d ed. 2011). An issuer may not offer securities to the public unless a registration 
statement has been filed with the SEC and sales of such securities cannot be completed until the 
registration statement is declared effective by the SEC. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e(a)–(c); see generally Joan 
MacLeod Heminway & Shelden Ryan Hoffman, Proceed at Your Peril: Crowdfunding and the 
Securities Act of 1933, 78 TENN. L. REV. 879, 907 (2011) (noting broad sweep of Section 5 of the 
Securities Act); STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND 
ANALYSIS 393–401 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 3d. ed. 2012) (describing the public offering 
process). 
40. 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(1). 
41. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a). 
42. 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2). Although the term prospectus can be broadly construed, Section 
12(a)(2) is limited to public offerings of securities. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 584 
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To avoid the costs associated with being subject to the registration 
requirements of the Securities Act (and its accompanying civil liability 
provisions), an issuer must structure the sales of securities to fit within 
an exemption.
43
 For example, Section 3(a)(11) of the Securities Act 
provides a statutory exemption from registration for securities offered 
and sold to persons residing in a single state by an issuer incorporated in 
and doing business in that same state.
44
 Another, better-known statutory 
exemption from registration is found in Section 4(a)(2), which exempts 
“transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering.”45 Since the 
statute does not explicitly define “public offering,” this term has been 
construed by the SEC and federal courts as offerings involving investors 
who are not “able to fend for themselves.”46 
To provide additional clarity and predictability in the use of Section 
4(a)(2)’s private placement exemption, the SEC promulgated Regulation 
D.
47
 Rule 506 of Regulation D provides a safe harbor based on Section 
4(a)(2)’s private placement exemption, which allows an issuer to offer 
and sell, without registration, an unlimited aggregate principal amount of 
securities to any number of “accredited investors” so long as certain 
conditions are met.
48
 A Rule 506 offering may include up to thirty-five 
                                                     
(1995) (defining the term “prospectus” as “a document that describes a public offering of 
securities”). 
43. The rationale behind these exemptions is that the registration safeguards may not be necessary 
in certain situations. See H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 5 (1933) (noting the inefficiency of requiring 
registration “where there is no practical need for [application of the Securities Act] or where the 
public benefits are too remote”); C. Edward Fletcher, III, Sophisticated Investors Under the Federal 
Securities Laws, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1081, 1133 (1988) (“As a historical matter, Congress did not 
design the securities laws to protect investors capable of protecting themselves.”). 
44. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11). Generally, an offering qualifies as an “intrastate offering” if it 
involves local investors, local companies, and local financing. See Section 3(a)(11) Exemption for 
Local Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 33-4434 (Dec. 6, 1961). Historically, the SEC and the 
courts have construed this exemption very narrowly, so issuers trying to rely on this exemption avail 
themselves of the Rule 147 safe harbor. See CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 39, at 583–85. An 
offering that meets the requirements of Rule 147 is deemed to qualify for the section 3(a)(11) 
intrastate offering exemption. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (2015). 
45. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2).  
46. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953). The Supreme Court held that the 
applicability of this exemption “should turn on whether the particular class of persons affected need 
the protection of the [Securities] Act,” which is designed “to protect investors by promoting full 
disclosure of information thought necessary to informed investment decisions.” Id. at 124–25.  
47. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.500–230.508. See Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 39, at 915 
(highlighting the clarifying purpose of Regulation D). 
48. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(a), (c). The definition of “accredited investor” includes certain 
institutional investors, such as banks and insurance companies, individuals with a net worth over $1 
million (excluding the investor’s primary residence) or annual income over $200,000 for the 
previous two years, private business development companies, certain trusts and business 
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investors that are non-accredited, so long as they are able to evaluate the 
potential gains and risks associated with the investment and the issuer 
refrains from engaging in general solicitation.
49
 Another set of 
exemptions contained in Regulation D, Rule 504
50
 (which exempts 
offerings under $1 million) and Rule 505
51
 (which exempts offerings 
under $5 million), are based on Section 3(b)(1) of the Securities Act, 
which grants the SEC rulemaking authority to exempt offerings 
involving $5 million or less from the Act’s registration requirements.52 
In recent years, Congress has sought to further facilitate the ability of 
issuers to offer and sell securities without registration by increasing the 
availability and scope of exemptions. The Jumpstart Our Business 
Startups Act (JOBS Act)
53
 amended the Securities Act by adding Section 
3(b)(2) and directing the SEC to update and expand the Regulation A 
exemption to allow offerings of up to $50 million, a substantial increase 
from the pre-existing $5 million cap.
54
 The SEC adopted the new 
Regulation A rules in June 2015.
55
 The JOBS Act also added Section 
4(a)(6) to the Securities Act, creating a new exemption from registration 
for a type of capital raising known as “crowdfunding,” which uses the 
                                                     
organizations with assets exceeding $5 million, and directors, executive officers or general partners 
of the issuer. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(1)–(6). 
49. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.506(b), 230.502(c). Although there are no disclosure requirements in 
transactions involving accredited investors, sales to unaccredited investors must meet certain 
disclosure requirements set forth in Rule 502(b). 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501–230.508.  
50. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504. 
51. Id. § 230.505. 
52. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(1) (2012). 
53. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act), Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012).  
54. JOBS Act § 401. Regulation A was originally promulgated by the SEC under its Section 3(b) 
authority to exempt smaller offerings of up to $5 million. However, the exemption was rarely used, 
with only nineteen qualified Regulation A offerings from 2009 to 2012 for a total offering amount 
of $73 million. See Proposed Rule Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under 
Section 3(b) of the Securities Act, Securities Act Release No. 33-9497, at 11 (Dec. 18, 2013). By 
comparison, during the same time period, there were approximately 27,500 offerings of up to $5 
million that were conducted under one of the Regulation D exemptions, with a total offering amount 
of approximately $25 billion. Id. Under the new Section 3(b)(2) exemption, an issuer may offer and 
sell up to $50 million in securities within a twelve-month period. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(2).  
55. As adopted, Regulation A+ provides for two tiers of offerings: Tier 1, for offerings of 
securities of up to $20 million, and Tier 2, for offerings of securities of up to $50 million. Both tiers 
are subject to certain basic eligibility requirements, while Tier 2 offerings are also subject to 
additional disclosure and ongoing reporting requirements, including a requirement to provide 
audited financial statements and file periodic reports. See Amendments for Small and Additional 
Issues Exemptions under the Securities Act (Regulation A), Securities Act Release No. 33-9741, at 7 
(Mar. 25, 2015). 
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internet to pool small individual contributions.
56
 The SEC promulgated 
the crowdfunding rules in May 2016.
57
 
Although exemptions from registration seek to lower the cost of 
capital, there are risks associated with the accompanying reduction in the 
amount of information that issuers must disclose to investors as part of 
the offering process.
58
 Exempting small offerings from registration thus 
reflects a policy tradeoff.
59
 On one hand, the social benefits of forcing 
disclosure requirements upon small issuers appear less significant given 
the minimal role these companies play in the secondary markets and in 
the economy in general, while the compliance costs incurred by these 
issuers are likely high.
60
 On the other hand, to the extent that smaller 
companies present a disproportionate risk of failure and fraud, 
expanding exemptions from the registration requirements for these 




For investors purchasing securities in offerings that are exempt from 
registration, the civil liability provisions of the Securities Act, namely 
Sections 11 and 12(a)(2), are unavailable. These investors, however, 
may still bring a cause of action under Section 10(b) of the Exchange 
Act
62
 and its implementing rule, Rule 10b-5, which generally prohibits 
fraud and deceptive practices “in connection with the purchase or sale of 
                                                     
56. JOBS Act §§ 301–02.  
57. Crowdfunding, Securities Act Release No. 33-9974, at 1 (Oct. 30, 2015). 
58. See Daniel J. Morrissey, The Securities Act at Its Diamond Jubilee: Renewing the Case for a 
Robust Registration Requirement, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 749, 757–59 (2009) (describing the SEC’s 
objectives in requiring securities registration as protecting investors and ensuring confidence in the 
integrity of the public capital markets). 
59. See, e.g., Examining Investor Risks in Capital Raising: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sec., 
Ins., & Inv. of the Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 2 (2011) (statement 
of John C. Coates IV, Professor of Law and Economics, Harvard Law School), 
http://www.banking.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/1d24b42e-3ef8-4653-bfe8-9c476740fafa/33A69 
9FF535D59925B69836A6E068FD0.coatestestimony121411.pdf [https://perma.cc/6TJN-AEGG] 
(noting “the balance that existing securities laws and regulations have struck between the 
transaction costs of raising capital . . . and the combined costs of fraud risk and asymmetric and 
unverifiable information” (emphasis in original)). 
60. See Carlos Berdejó, Going Public After the JOBS Act, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 18–19 (2015) 
(arguing that the optimality of mandating registration on a particular set of issuers depends on the 
relative benefits and costs associated with the mandated disclosures); Michael D. Guttentag, 
Accuracy Enhancement, Agency Costs, and Disclosure Regulation, 3 REV. L. AND ECON. 611, 625–
27 (2007) (arguing that requiring disclosure for larger firms may be efficient and socially desirable). 
61. See Jill E. Fisch, Can Internet Offerings Bridge the Small Business Capital Barrier?, 2 J. 
SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 57, 58 (1998) (“[R]egulators have identified small businesses as some 
of the riskiest investment opportunities.”). 
62. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).  
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any security.”63 Although the scope of the Rule 10b-5 appears to be 
broader, a cause of action under this provision is more complicated for 
plaintiffs relative to a Section 11 or Section 12(a)(2) claim.
64
 
1. Private Enforcement of Federal Laws 
The causes of action available to an investor who has been defrauded 
in a securities transaction will depend on whether the transaction in 
question was exempt from the Securities Act’s registration requirements. 
If the transaction was exempt from registration, then an investor could 
have a Rule 10b-5 cause of action.
65
 If the transaction was not exempt 
from registration and there was no effective registration statement 
covering the securities, then in addition to the Rule 10b-5 claim, an 
investor will be able to pursue the more straightforward Section 12(a)(1) 
and rescind the transaction.
66
 Finally, if the transaction is not exempt 
from registration and the offering was registered, in addition to the Rule 




But investors who have a valid claim under the securities laws will 
not necessarily bring a lawsuit to assert their rights. From an investor’s 
perspective, pursuing a claim in court can in itself be quite a risky 
proposition. The fixed costs of bringing a lawsuit can be large, and a 
single investor may not have the resources or economic incentives to 
pursue a claim.
68
 If the investor does not prevail in court, not only will 
                                                     
63. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2015). 
64. To prevail in a Rule 10b-5 claim, an investor must establish a number of elements, including 
a material misrepresentation or omission, scienter, reliance, and loss causation. See Erica P. John 
Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 563 U.S. 804, 809–10 (2011). On the other hand, to succeed in a 
Section 11 or 12(a)(2) claim, a plaintiff only need establish the existence of a material 
misrepresentation in the registration statement or prospectus. See supra notes 41–42 and 
accompanying text. 
65. See supra notes 62–64 and accompanying text. 
66. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. Selling securities without a registration statement 
being in effect is a violation of Section 5(a), thus giving rise to a Section 12(a)(1) claim. See supra 
note 39. This Section 12(a)(1) cause of action is independent of any potential fraudulent statement 
made by the seller. See supra notes 41–42. 
67. See supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text. 
68. This follows if we model a plaintiff’s decision to purse a civil action as a weighing of the 
costs of bringing a lawsuit and the amount of money the plaintiff expects to recover from 
defendants. For an example of such a model, see A. Mitchell Polinsky, Private versus Public 
Enforcement of Fines, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 105, 107 (1980). For a numerical example of how litigation 
costs provide a disincentive to plaintiffs from filing civil suits if the amount of recovery does not 
exceed the associated costs, see Alex Stein and Gideon Parchomovsky, Empowering Individual 
Plaintiffs 4 (Sept. 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with University of Pennsylvania Law 
School Legal Scholarship Repository), http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article 
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the investor not be compensated for their original loss, but they will also 
have spent additional resources. And even if the investor prevails, 
enforcing a judgment may be extremely costly if, for example, the 
defendant is bankrupt, has no assets to attach, or has otherwise 
absconded.
69
 Arguably, the costs and risks associated with bringing a 
lawsuit are likely to present a more formidable barrier to investors who 
have suffered relatively small losses. 
The solution to this investor dilemma lies in the contingency fee and 
class action mechanisms. Class actions, in which an attorney represents a 
group of similarly harmed investors, can effectively spread the costs 
associated with securities litigation, thus making it economically feasible 
for injured investors to bring their claims in court.
70
 Moreover, since 
attorneys representing a class are often compensated only if the class 
wins (i.e., by a contingency fee), class actions also reduce the risk of 
bringing a lawsuit by protecting investors from additional losses in the 
event that the lawsuit is dismissed or otherwise fails.
71
 The merits of the 
securities class action mechanism and its effectiveness in deterring fraud 
and compensating its victims have been highly debated in the 
                                                     
=2666&context=faculty_scholarship [https://perma.cc/3Y27-YVR8]. It is worth noting that the 
smaller the investor’s loss, the larger attorney and court costs will be relative to the recovery that the 
investor could obtain. 
69. See Letter from Mary Beth Buchanan, Dir. Exec. Office for U.S. Attorneys, U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, to Gary T. Engel, Dir. Fin. Mgmt. & Assurance, U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office (Jan. 13, 
2005), in U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-80, CRIMINAL DEBT: COURT-ORDERED 
RESTITUTION AMOUNTS FAR EXCEED LIKELY COLLECTIONS FOR THE CRIME VICTIMS IN SELECTED 
FINANCIAL FRAUD CASES 20–22 (2005), http://www.gao.gov/assets/250/245227.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/22SW-8PTU]. Even the SEC has problems collecting civil fines and disgorgements from 
defendants. See U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, FISCAL YEAR 2014 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET 
JUSTIFICATION, FISCAL YEAR 2014 ANNUAL PERFORMANCE PLAN, AND FISCAL YEAR 2012 
ANNUAL PERFORMANCE REPORT 32, 36 (2013) (noting that between 2007 and 2012, the SEC 
secured $13.83 billion in civil fines and disgorgements, but collected only $7.3 billion despite 
considerable efforts); Michael Rothfeld & Brad Reagan, A Maze of Paper: SEC Judgment Against 
Raider Paul Bilzerian: $62 Million. Collected: $3.7 Million, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 16, 2014, 7:52 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/for-decades-ex-corporate-raider-holds-off-sec-effort-to-collect-62-
million-judgment-1410892550 [https://perma.cc/B8GP-5C82] (detailing difficulties faced by the 
SEC in enforcing a monetary judgment in a high-profile case). 
70. See Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1465, 1466 
(2004) (explaining how class actions address collective action problems confronting shareholders). 
For an overview of the literature on securities class action, see James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, 
Mapping the American Shareholder Litigation Experience: A Survey of Empirical Studies of the 
Enforcement of the U.S. Securities Laws, 6 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 164, 170 (2009). 
71. See James J. Park, Rules, Principles, and the Competition to Enforce the Securities Laws, 100 
CAL. L. REV. 115, 159 (2012) (noting that class action attorneys are willing to invest resources as 
they are motivated by the possibility of a large contingency fee).  
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 What is certainly less controversial is the proposition that 
smaller issuers are relatively immune to class actions, significantly 
reducing any deterrence or compensation value of such mechanism.
73
 
The structure of attorney compensation in class actions renders these 
ineffective in the context of small-scale fraud, which results in a skewed 
composition of securities fraud class actions favoring cases involving 
large-scale fraud.
74
 Securities class actions in federal court involve fraud 
by large companies whose securities trade in the national stock 
exchanges (and are less likely to be judgment proof); not surprisingly, 
these class actions relate to frauds that are large in magnitude (which 
correlates with the compensation of plaintiffs’ attorneys).75 In cases 
where the aggregate amounts involved are small, the loss suffered by the 
potential plaintiffs may not be sufficiently high to attract the interest of a 
                                                     
72. See James Bohn & Stephen Choi, Fraud in the New-Issues Market: Empirical Evidence on 
Securities Class Actions, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 903, 979 (1996) (“[E]mpirical results show that most 
securities-fraud class actions are, in fact, frivolous.”); Choi, supra note 70, at 1477–98 (reviewing 
prior studies suggesting securities class actions were often nonmeritorious); John C. Coffee, Jr., 
Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106 
COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1545 (2006) (citing empirical evidence that settlements recover only a very 
small share of investor losses and concluding that “[f]rom a compensatory perspective, the 
conclusion seems inescapable that the securities class action performs poorly”); A.C. Pritchard, 
Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class Actions with Exchanges as Securities Enforcers, 
85 VA. L. REV. 925, 947–50 (1999) (arguing that “securities class actions are an expensive way to 
reduce the social costs of fraud” and are “susceptible to overreaching by plaintiffs’ attorneys, which 
means that shareholders may receive only a small percentage of their recoverable damages”). 
73. See Coffee, supra note 72, at 1543 (“[T]he conventional wisdom has long been that 
companies with small market capitalizations are less likely to be sued in securities class actions.”); 
Bohn & Choi, supra note 72, at 936 (concluding that “smaller sized offerings hardly ever 
experience a securities-fraud suit”). 
74. See Pritchard, supra note 72, at 951–52 (“The contingent percentage fee also discourages 
plaintiffs’ lawyers from bringing suit in cases where the damage recovery will be too small to 
justify their fees, even if the evidence of fraud is strong. For this reason, companies with small 
capitalizations or trading volume may be effectively immune from the threat of a class action 
suit.”); Alicia Davis Evans, The Investor Compensation Fund, 33 J. CORP. L. 223, 239 (2007) 
(noting that small firms are less likely to be sued because of attorney incentives given that “the 
potential recovery in a class action lawsuit involving a large firm with actively traded shares is 
likely to exceed the recovery in a case involving a small firm with thinly traded stock”); Coffee, 
supra note 72, at 1543 (noting that because attorney fees are related to the size of recovery, small 
market capitalization companies are less likely to be sued).  
75. On average, 189 securities class actions were filed in federal court each year during the period 
1997–2013, of which 172 involved securities trading in the New York Stock Exchange or Nasdaq. 
See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS: 2014 YEAR IN REVIEW 4, 24 
(2015), http://securities.stanford.edu/research-reports/1996-2014/Cornerstone-Research-Securities-
Class-Action-Filings-2014-YIR.pdf [https://perma.cc/QWM8-JHW7]. The average change in 
defendants’ market capitalization between the trading day immediately preceding the beginning of 
the class period and the trading day immediately following the end of the class period was $124 
billion. Id. at 6. 
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plaintiff’s attorney.76 Although the precise threshold of what defines a 
small company or offering is not evident, it certainly is higher than the 
one for the type of small, localized fraud considered in this Article.
77
 
2. Public Enforcement of Federal Laws 
The public sector, led by the SEC, also plays a critical role in 
enforcing securities laws.
78
 In those cases it chooses to pursue, the SEC 
may bring a civil enforcement action in federal court or commence an 
administrative proceeding.
79
 Contested administrative proceedings are 
heard by one of five SEC-appointed judges.
80
 When determining in 
which forum to bring a case, the SEC considers a series of factors, 




From the SEC’s perspective, administrative actions present a number 
of advantages over civil suits in federal court.
82
 First, administrative 
actions are handled internally and entail more expedient proceedings 
with less exacting evidentiary requirements, which allows the SEC to 
prosecute a greater number of cases given its budgetary constraints.
83
 
                                                     
76. See James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas & Dana Kiku, SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An 
Empirical Inquiry, 53 DUKE L. J. 737, 744 (2003). 
77. See, e.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities 
Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 511–13 (1991) (finding that none of the initial public offerings 
(IPOs) in the early 1980s that had market losses under $20 million resulted in litigation); Bohn & 
Choi, supra note 72, at 926–37 (finding that during the period 1975–1986 less than one percent of 
IPOs with an offering amount of less than $5 million resulted in a securities class action). 
78. Section 21(a) of the Exchange Act broadly authorizes the SEC to conduct investigations “to 
determine whether any person has violated . . . any provision of [the Exchange Act], [or] the rules or 
regulations thereunder.” Exchange Act § 21(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) (2012). See also Cox, Thomas & 
Kiku, supra note 76, at 738–45 (describing the public–private partnership for the enforcement of the 
U.S. securities laws); John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156 U. 
PA. L. REV. 229, 304 (2007) (suggesting that flaws in private securities enforcement may warrant 
increased reliance on public enforcement). 
79. Securities Act § 8A, 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1 (2012); Exchange Act § 21C, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3.  
80.  See Jean Eaglesham, SEC Is Steering More Trials to Judges It Appoints, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 
21, 2014, 9:40 AM), http://on.wsj.com/1QpFpBz (last visited Apr. 17, 2017). SEC administrative-
law judges are appointed and paid by the agency and report to the five SEC commissioners. See 
Jean Eaglesham, Fairness of SEC Judges Is in Spotlight, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 22, 2015, 9:25 PM), 
http://on.wsj.com/1QpGV6G (last visited Apr. 30, 2017). 
81. See Aruna Viswanatha, SEC Issues Guidance on Venues for Cases, WALL ST. J. (May 8, 
2015, 7:06 PM), http://on.wsj.com/1QpB7u6 (last visited Apr. 17, 2017). 
82. See Cox, Thomas & Kiku, supra note 76, at 749 (presenting evidence that the SEC has “a 
strong preference for administrative enforcement actions”).  
83. See Jean Eaglesham, SEC Fights Challenges to Its In-House Courts, WALL ST. J. (June 21, 
2015, 7:06 PM), http://on.wsj.com/1QpBtAK (last visited Apr. 17, 2017); Eaglesham, SEC Is 
Steering More Trials to Judges It Appoints, supra note 80 (noting that rulings in administrative 
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Second, because the administrative judges who preside over these 
administrative actions have special knowledge of the securities laws and 
industry, the fact-finding process can be more streamlined and 
sophisticated.
84
 Historically, however, administrative actions did suffer a 
number of significant limitations relative to civil court actions—
restrictions on the class of defendant, the type of remedies, and the range 
of options regarding what to do with the funds recovered from a 
defendant.
85
 These limitations made administrative actions less attractive 
relative to civil actions. 
Historically, the ability of the SEC to obtain monetary remedies as a 
result of an administrative proceeding was quite limited. Prior to 1990, 
the SEC could only impose civil penalties in cases involving insider 
trading and certain violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
86
 and 
it lacked the authority to order disgorgement.
87
 To obtain monetary 
relief, the SEC had to bring a civil action and ask the court to exercise its 
equitable powers and order an “ancillary relief.”88 In 1990, Congress 
substantially expanded the range of remedies that the SEC could pursue 
administratively, granting the SEC the power to obtain the disgorgement 
of ill-gotten gains
89
 and civil penalties.
90
 But even after the 1990 
                                                     
proceedings are usually handed down within 300 days of the case being filed, compared to years for 
the typical federal-court case).  
84. See Eaglesham, SEC Is Steering More Trials to Judges It Appoints, supra note 80 (quoting the 
SEC enforcement chief as saying: “[w]e’re using administrative proceedings more extensively 
because they offer a streamlined process with sophisticated fact finders”). However, the specialized 
expertise of these judges is an open question. See Jean Eaglesham, U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
Criticizes SEC’s In-House Court, WALL ST. J. (July 15, 2015, 12:01 AM), http://on.wsj.com/ 
1QpCJnn (last visited Apr. 17, 2017) (citing a U.S. Chamber of Commerce report that states that 
during the last thirty years, the SEC “has not hired a single [administrative law judge] who had 
directly relevant experience or expertise related to the federal securities laws”). 
85. For a summary of the historical development surrounding SEC administrative actions and a 
description of the main differences between administrative and civil proceedings involving the SEC, 
see Urska Velikonja, Are the SEC’s Administrative Law Judges Biased? An Empirical Investigation, 
92 WASH. L. REV. 315, 32427 (2017). 
86. See Verity Winship, Fair Funds and the SEC’s Compensation of Injured Investors, 60 FLA. L. 
REV. 1103, 1113–14 (2008).  
87. See Urska Velikonja, Public Compensation for Private Harm: Evidence from the SEC’s Fair 
Fund Distributions, 67 STAN. L. REV. 331, 340 (2015).  
88. Id. at 339–40. 
89. See Velikonja, supra note 87, at 341; U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT PURSUANT TO 
SECTION 308(C) OF THE SARBANES OXLEY ACT OF 2002, at 33 (2003), http://www.sec.gov/ 
news/studies/sox308creport.pdf [https://perma.cc/CA2V-X4MT] [hereinafter 308(C) REPORT]. To 
order disgorgement, the SEC has to show that the defendant profited from the securities violation, 
not just that the investor lost money due to the fraud. See SEC v. Blavin, 760 F.2d 706, 713 (6th Cir. 
1985) (“The purpose of disgorgement is to force ‘a defendant to give up the amount by which he 
was unjustly enriched’ rather than to compensate the victims of fraud.” (quoting SEC v. 
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reforms, the SEC could only impose civil fines in an administrative 
proceeding in actions involving regulated entities, such as broker-dealers 
and investment advisors; for other entities, the SEC still needed to 
pursue the case in federal court and request that the court order the 
defendant to pay a civil fine.
91
 The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 further 
expanded the SEC’s authority to impose civil fines in administrative 
proceedings against any entity or person.
92
 Anecdotal evidence suggests 
that the SEC has since brought an increasing number of enforcement 
actions administratively rather than in federal court.
93
 For example, in 
2014, the SEC brought more than four out of five of its enforcement 
actions as administrative proceedings, a substantial increase over the 
prior decade’s rate, which was below fifty percent.94 
Although penalizing the wrongdoers certainly enhances the deterrent 
effect of the securities laws, it does, by itself, little for the victims who 
have suffered an economic loss as a result of securities fraud. Prior to the 
enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002,
95
 injured investors could 
only be compensated with funds obtained by the SEC from securities 
law violators through a court disgorgement order—civil penalties were 
not available for compensation purposes and were transferred to the 
United States Treasury.
96
 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act authorized the SEC to 
add civil fines paid in enforcement actions to disgorgement funds.
97
 
These funds, commonly referred to as “fair funds,” are established by 
the SEC to compensate investors by restoring and distributing ill-gotten 
                                                     
Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 102 (2d Cir. 1978))); id. at 3 n.2 (“Restitution is 
intended to make investors whole, and disgorgement is meant to deprive the wrongdoer of their ill-
gotten gain.”).  
90. See Winship, supra note 86, at 1114–17.  
91. See Velikonja, supra note 87, at 339–40; Winship, supra note 86, at 1114–16.  
92. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd-Frank) Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, § 929P, 124 Stat. 1376, 1862–65 (2010) (codified at Securities Act § 8A(g), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77h-1(g) (2012)).  
93. See Gretchen Morgenson, At the S.E.C., a Question of Home-Court Edge, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/06/business/at-the-sec-a-question-of-home-court-edge.html 
(last visited Apr. 17, 2017) (quoting the SEC’s enforcement co-director as saying that the SEC “will 
be bringing more administrative proceedings”). 
94. See Jean Eaglesham, SEC Wins With In-House Judges, WALL. ST. J. (May 6, 2015, 10:30 
PM), http://on.wsj.com/1ff5XoH (last visited Apr. 17, 2017). 
95. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley Act), Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 
(codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). 
96. Generally, civil fines and penalties collected by federal agencies must be remitted to the U.S. 
Treasury’s general fund. See Velikonja, supra note 89, at 341–42. 
97. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 308(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7246(a) (2012). 
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gains to victims of a securities law violation.
98
 More recently, the Dodd-
Frank Act authorized the SEC to distribute civil penalties to victims of 
securities violations even in cases in which no disgorgement has been 
ordered by a court.
99
 As a result, the SEC may now, at its discretion, 
transfer funds obtained from (1) disgorgement and (2) civil penalties 
paid by a defendant following any judicial or administrative enforcement 
action to a distribution fund earmarked for injured investors.
100
 
Though certainly investor-friendly, these recent developments are 
likely to be of little help to victims of small-scale fraud. Due to limited 
resources, the SEC cannot investigate all alleged securities violations 
brought to its attention.
101
 In deciding which alleged violations to 
investigate, the SEC prioritizes based on a number of factors, including 
the magnitude of the potential violation and its relative harm to 
investors, the deterrent effects of pursuing such action, the SEC’s 
visibility in policing key areas, and the resources that would be 
required.
102
 Some commentators have also stressed the role of politics in 
the SEC’s enforcement decision-making process.103 Arguably, small and 
                                                     
98. See Cox, Thomas & Kiku, supra note 76, at 754.  
99. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929B, 124 Stat. 1376, 1852 (2010) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7246(a)) (amending Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 308(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7246(a)). 
100. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 308, 15 U.S.C. § 7246 (2012). See also 308(C) REPORT, supra note 
89, at 4–5. 
101. This concern that the SEC may not have the resources to adequately police the markets is 
not new. See Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 315 (1985) (noting that 
“the securities markets have grown dramatically in size and complexity, while [SEC] enforcement 
resources have declined” and that the SEC “does not have the resources to police the [securities] 
industry sufficiently”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This has become a bigger 
issue in an era of government downsizing and increased reliance on the SEC. See Jill E. Fisch, Class 
Action Reform: Lessons from Securities Litigation, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 533, 555 (1997) (“Concerns 
about limiting the size of government and political pressure to reduce expenditures on public 
enforcement support increased reliance on private enforcement.”).  
102. See Human Capital: Major Human Capital Challenges at SEC and Key Trade Agencies: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of Gov’t Mgmt., Restructuring & the Dist. of Columbia 
of the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong. 6 (2002) (statement of Richard J. Hillman, 
Director of Financial Markets and Community Involvement, General Accounting Office, and Loren 
Yager, Director of International Affairs and Trade, General Accounting Office) (“[The] SEC 
generally prioritizes the cases in terms of (1) the message delivered to the industry and public about 
the reach of SEC’s enforcement efforts, (2) the amount of investor harm done, (3) the deterrent 
value of the action, and (4) SEC’s visibility in certain areas such as insider trading and financial 
fraud.”); DIV. OF ENF’T, SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, ENF’T MANUAL 4–5 (2015) (listing factors and 
considerations to be taken into account when prioritizing investigations); Cox, Thomas & Kiku, 
supra note 76, at 759 (“[T]he SEC gauges its enforcement priorities by the message the action sends 
to the industry and public, the relative harm to investors, the deterrent effects of the action, and the 
visibility the SEC enjoys in combating such abuses.”). 
103. See, e.g., Pritchard, supra note 72, at 1018 (“Politicians happily provide the SEC whatever 
tools it deems necessary to fight insider trading and the SEC cultivates political support through its 
 
05 - Berdejo.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/28/2017  1:51 PM 
586 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:567 
 
local instances of fraud are less likely to be highly ranked under either 
metric. Not surprisingly, issuers subject to SEC enforcement actions are 
relatively large and so are the amounts of monetary losses involved.
104
 
Moreover, the fixed costs associated with establishing a fair fund and the 
administrative costs involved in designing and implementing a 
distribution plan (e.g., locating the victims to be compensated) make 




B. State Regulation of the Securities Markets 
Transactions involving securities are also subject to regulation at the 
state level.
106
 Most of the state securities statutes are based on a version 
of the Uniform Securities Act, a model code which largely tracks the 
federal regulatory approach described above.
107
 As under the Securities 
Act, sales of securities in a state must either be registered or fall within 
an exemption from registration under the state’s securities law.108 State 
securities statutes also contain civil liability provisions that mirror their 
                                                     
insider trading enforcement regime. But this strict enforcement comes at a cost, as even trivial 
insider trading cases are prosecuted. Such prosecutions may chill market investigation and impose 
substantial opportunity costs while other frauds go unprosecuted.”); Urska Velikonja, Politics in 
Securities Enforcement, 50 GA. L. REV. 17, 19 (2015) (“[W]hile politics is largely irrelevant at the 
individual case level, political influences do shape [the SEC’s] enforcement choices at the aggregate 
level.”). 
104. The average market capitalization of respondent companies in a 2003 study of SEC 
enforcement actions was $1.1 billion. See Cox, Thomas & Kiku, supra note 76, at 765. In the same 
study, the average settlement was $9.8 million. See id. at 764. According to the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics Inflation Calculator, as of May 16, 2017, in 2016 dollars these figures are $1.4 billion and 
$12.8 million, respectively. This inflation calculator is available at CPI Inflation Calculator, U.S. 
DEP’T OF LABOR: BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator. 
htm [https://perma.cc/JF86-MBZV]. 
105. See 308(C) REPORT, supra note 89, at 14 (noting that compensating investors “is not always 
economically feasible”); Velikonja, supra note 89, at 351. The average size of the 243 fair funds 
established by the SEC between 2002 and 2013 was $59.5 million dollars, with the median fund 
distributing $16.5 million. See id. at 352. 
106. All fifty states have adopted securities statutes, commonly referred to as blue-sky laws. See 
LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 41 (3d ed., rev. 1998).  
107. At least forty states have adopted some version of the Uniform Securities Act. See LOSS & 
SELIGMAN, supra note 106, at 42. A few notable states, California, Texas, New York, and Florida, 
have securities statutes that deviate from the Uniform Securities Act. Id. at 34 n.39. 
108. See, e.g., UNIF. SEC. ACT § 301 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 
1956) (providing that “[i]t is unlawful for any person to offer or sell any security in this state unless 
(1) it is registered under this act or (2) the security or transaction is exempted under section 402”); 
see also Mark A. Sargent, State Disclosure Regulation and the Allocation of Regulatory 
Responsibilities, 46 MD. L. REV. 1027, 1031 (1987) (“Every state securities act, like the 1933 Act, 
requires every sale of securities in the state to be either registered or exempt from registration.”). 
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federal counterpart and grant investors a cause of action against 
promoters and issuers that sell securities without registration or who, 




1. The Federal-State Partnership 
Although the ineffectiveness of state law in preventing fraud was one 
of the driving forces behind the enactment of the federal securities laws 
in the 1930s,
110
 the latter were intended, at least originally, to 
complement rather than replace existing state laws.
111
 This dual 
regulatory system lasted well into the 1990s,
112
 when the federal 
government enacted the National Securities Market Improvement Act 
(NSMIA).
113
 NSMIA prohibits states from enforcing their registration 
requirements for offerings of “covered securities,” a term which includes 
securities listed on a national exchange or offered in Rule 506 private 
placements, among others.
114
 NSMIA sought to reduce the cost of 
capital for issuers, which previously had to comply not only with all 
                                                     
109. See UNIF. SEC. ACT § 509(b) (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 
2002) (granting rescissory rights to investors who purchase from someone who sold a security “in 
violation of Section 301 [the Act’s registration provision] or, by means of an untrue statement of a 
material fact”). Moreover, the general anti-fraud provisions of the Uniform Securities Act which 
grant standing to public enforcers are substantially based on Rule 10b-5. See UNIF. SEC. ACT § 101 
cmt. (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 1956). (This section “is 
substantially the [SEC’s Rule 10B-5]”); UNIF. SEC. ACT § 501 cmt. 1 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF 
COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2002) (“Section 501, which was Section 101 in the 1956 Act, was 
modeled after Rule 10b-5 . . . .”); LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 106, at 42.  
110. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 20 (4th ed. 2002). Prior to 
the enactment of the Securities Act, transactions in securities were exclusively the domain of state 
law. Kansas adopted the first blue-sky statute in 1911, and by the time Congress adopted the 
Securities Act every state except Nevada had a securities law. See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 
106, at 36–40. 
111. See Renee M. Jones, Dynamic Federalism: Competition, Cooperation and Securities 
Enforcement, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 112 (2005). The Securities Act and the Exchange Act both 
contain savings clauses, preserving the continued viability of state securities statutes. See Securities 
Act § 18(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77r(c) (2012); Exchange Act § 28(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (2012).  
112. See Jones, supra note 111, at 112–14; Rutherford B. Campbell, Jr., The Insidious Remnants 
of State Rules Respecting Capital Formation, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 407, 411–13 (2000). 
113. Pub. L. No. 104-290, 11 Stat. 3416 (1996); Securities Act of 1933 § 18(a), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77r(a).  
114. See Manning Gilbert Warren III, Reflections on Dual Regulation of Securities: A Case 
Against Preemption, 25 B.C. L. REV. 495, 515–24 (1984); Manning Gilbert Warren III, Reflections 
on Dual Regulations of Securities: A Case for Reallocation of Regulatory Responsibilities, 78 
WASH. U. L.Q. 497, 500–04 (2000).  
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existing federal requirements, but also with the registration requirements 
of every state in which they offered and sold securities.
115
 
The merits of NSMIA have been extensively debated, with critics 
arguing that the broad nature of the statute left a significant portion of 
the securities markets virtually unregulated both at the federal and state 
levels.
116
 In an unregulated marketplace for private offerings where the 
screening and informational functions of registration requirements are 
absent, retail investors can become easy prey for unscrupulous 
promoters.
117
 Moreover, to the extent that smaller companies present a 
disproportionate risk of failure and fraud, expanding exemptions to the 
registration requirements for these issuers can be particularly 
problematic.
118
 In fact, anecdotal evidence suggests that after the 
enactment of NSMIA, fraudulent transactions involving Rule 506 
offerings became more prevalent.
119
 To the extent that small, local 
                                                     
115. See Jennifer J. Johnson, Private Placements: A Regulatory Blackhole, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
151, 156–58 (2010) (examining legislative history of NSMIA). 
116. See Jennifer J. Johnson, Fleecing Grandma: A Regulatory Ponzi Scheme, 16 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 993, 995 (2012) (“Private offerings largely escape both federal and state regulatory 
scrutiny.”); Johnson, supra note 115, at 154–55 (“NSMIA’s preemption of state regulation of 
private placements, therefore, created a regulatory black hole—today, no one regulates these 
offerings.”).  
117. See Johnson, supra note 115, at 152 (“Many investors, including vulnerable senior citizens, 
are victimized each year in dubious securities offerings . . . . Most promoters involved in these 
questionable investment schemes sell securities pursuant to the so-called private placement 
exemption of the federal securities law.”); Letter from Joseph P. Borg, President, NASAA, and Dir., 
Ala. Sec. Comm’n, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n (Mar. 4, 2002), 
https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72301/borg1.htm [https://perma.cc/8TYH-JEWD] (“States 
frequently use violations of their registration provisions as the basis for stopping fraud. A state 
regulator can issue a cease and desist order or obtain a preliminary injunction by simply proving the 
existence of a security and the absence of an effective registration statement. Were the states, 
because of preemption, unable to use this tool, they would have to devote substantial time and effort 
to prove fraud, which prolongs the public’s exposure to harm and further taxes limited state 
resources.”).  
118. See supra note 61.  
119. See, e.g., Fred Joseph, Colo. Sec. Comm’r, President, North American Securities 
Administrators Association, News Conference Opening Statement at the National Press Club:  An 
Agenda for Change: How the 111th Congress Can Better Protect Investors (Jan. 29, 2009), 
http://www.nasaa.org/402/an-agenda-for-change-how-the-111th-congress-can-better-protect-
investors/ [https://perma.cc/5W9T-2F35] (stating that Rule 506 offerings have become the favorite 
Regulation D offering and that many of them are fraudulent); Enhancing Investor Protection and 
the Regulation of Securities Markets—Part 2: Hearing Before the Comm. on Banking, Hous., and 
Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 7 (2009) (statement of Fred J. Joseph, President, N. Am. Sec. Adm’rs 
Ass’n) (noting that since NSMIA was enacted, state regulators have witnessed a steady and 
significant rise in the number of fraudulent Rule 506 offerings); Johnson, supra note 115, at 188 
(noting that the Rule 506 offering has become “a favorite vehicle for fraudulent transactions”); 
Johnson, Fleecing Grandma: A Regulatory Ponzi Scheme, supra note 116, at 999–1000 (describing 
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securities offerings are more likely to fly under the regulators’ radar and 
involve less experienced and naive investors, one can safely assume that 
fraud is likely to be even more pervasive in these offerings.
120
 
Federal preemption has historically been a contentious issue for state 
regulators because “[m]any of the segments of the market that have been 
deregulated and that serve small and early-stage issuers involve 
significant investment risk and fraud.”121 Recently, this tension came to 
light during the Regulation A rulemaking process.
122
 The final 
Regulation A rules provide for the preemption of state securities law 
registration requirements for securities offered or sold in “Tier 2” 
offerings to “qualified purchasers,” a term broadly defined to include all 
offerees and purchasers in such offerings.
123
 At the time this provision 
was proposed, the North American Securities Administrators 
Association (NASAA) strongly objected to this preemption of state law, 
questioning whether the proposed definition of “qualified purchaser” 
was consistent with the public interest and the investor protection 
standards of NSMIA.
124
 Individual state regulators also criticized 
Regulation A+’s preemption of state regulation. William F. Galvin, 
Secretary of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, noted: 
We are dismayed and shocked to see that the [SEC’s] 
                                                     
the example of MedCap, which hired stockbrokers to sell over $2 billion of promissory notes to 
20,000 retail investors in a series of private placements). 
120. Moreover, given the diminished responsibility for state administrators in the ex ante 
regulation of offerings, one could arguably expect decreases in the resources and expertise invested 
into screening of small securities offerings to ensure that state registration requirements are being 
followed and that no fraudulent schemes are being carried out.  
121. Letter from William F. Galvin, Sec’y of the Commonwealth, Commonwealth of Mass., to 
U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n 2 (Dec. 18, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-11-13/s71113-
1.pdf [https://perma.cc/6PTS-MPSU] [hereinafter Galvin Letter]. 
122. See supra notes 53–55 and accompanying text. 
123. See Securities Act Release No. 33-9741, supra note 55, at 206–07. Tier 1 offerings will be 
subject to federal and state registration and qualification requirements, and issuers may take 
advantage of the coordinated review program developed by the North American Securities 
Administrators Association. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.  
124. Letter from Andrea Seidt, President, NASAA, to Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. and Exch. 
Comm’n 1 (Feb. 19, 2014), http://www.nasaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/NASAA-Letter-
Regarding-Reg-A+_021914.pdf [https://perma.cc/G4TY-AYGQ] [hereinafter Galvin Letter] (noting 
that state securities administrators “cannot do [their] job – protect investors or help small businesses 
access capital and grow their companies – where the Commission attempts to prohibit [their] 
review”). This letter also made a plea for cooperation between federal and state regulators as an 
alternative to preemption, and highlighted other alternatives such as NASAA’s new coordinated, 
streamlined multi-state review program. Id. at 1–2 (“There is no doubt in our minds that the 
Commission and the states, standing together, will be much more effective in protecting our citizens 
and making Regulation A+ a success for small business filers than we could ever hope to be 
standing apart.”). 
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Regulation [A+] proposal includes provisions that preempt the 
ability of the states to require registration of these offerings and 
to review them. The states have tackled preemption battles on 
many fronts, but never before have we found ourselves battling 
our federal counterpart. Shame on the SEC for this anti-investor 
proposal. This is a step that puts small retail investors 
unacceptably at risk. We urge the [SEC] to remove these 
provisions from the rule. 
Because many Regulation [A+] offerings will be made by small 
and early-stage issuers, they will involve significant risks. That 
makes these offerings a worrisome choice for small retail 
investors. Moreover, offerings made under the current 
Regulation A very often have a local character. If that pattern 
continues, Regulation [A+] offerings will also be sold 
substantially in the issuers’ home states and in local-area 
markets. For this reason alone, it is crucial for the states to have 




This preemption battle did not end with the final adoption of the 
revised Regulation A+ rules. The securities regulators of Montana and 
Massachusetts filed suit in federal court objecting to and challenging the 
SEC’s definition of “qualified purchaser” and to the federal preemption 
of state law in Regulation A+ offerings.
126
 In their brief, the state 
administrators also argued that the SEC’s cost-benefit analysis was 
flawed and that state laws policed by regulators with local knowledge 
could do more than the SEC to lessen the risks and costs of fraud.
127
 
2. Enforcement at the State Level 
Although NSMIA limits the role of state regulation with respect to the 
registration of securities, it does not impair a state’s ability to enforce its 
securities fraud statutes, whether judicially or administratively.
128
 In 
                                                     
125. Galvin Letter, supra note 121, at 1–2. 
126. Opening Brief of Petitioners at 25–26, Lindeen v. SEC, No. 15-1149 & Galvin v. SEC, No. 
15-1150 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 26, 2015).  
127. Id. at 27.  
128. Securities Act § 18(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77r(c)(1) (2012); see also Manning Gilbert Warren 
III, Federalism and Investor Protection: Constitutional Restraints on Preemption of State Remedies 
for Securities Fraud, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 169, 176 (1997); Jones, supra note 111, at 114–
15. NSMIA expressly preserved the authority of states to investigate and bring enforcement actions 
with respect to fraudulent or deceptive practices. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(c)(1) (“Consistent with this 
section, the securities commission . . . of any State shall retain jurisdiction under the laws of such 
State to investigate and bring enforcement actions, in connection with securities or securities 
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recent years, much attention has been devoted to the effectiveness of a 
system where state and federal actors have co-existing enforcement 
powers to investigate and prosecute fraud.
129
 This debate gained 
renewed attention following the increased role played by state regulators 
at the turn of the millennium in pursuing cases of national importance, 
the type one would expect to be pursued by federal regulators.
130
 
On one hand, state enforcement can play a key role in deterring 
untoward behavior in the national securities markets by bringing 
enforcement actions in cases that federal regulators should pursue but do 
not as a result of budgetary constraints
131
 or lax enforcement policies.
132
 
However, one may be concerned about the efficiency of having 
concurrent investigations and the potential duplication of enforcement 
costs—existing studies suggest that state actions target firms in the 
financial sector on an industry-wide basis, significantly overlapping with 
                                                     
transactions . . . with respect to . . . fraud or deceit.”); Amanda M. Rose, The Multienforcer 
Approach to Securities Fraud Deterrence: A Critical Analysis, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2173, 2175 
(2010) (“[I]n addition to facing federal fraud liability at the hands of both the SEC and class action 
plaintiffs, participants in the U.S. national securities markets also face potential fraud liability at the 
hands of fifty state governments.”). 
129. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 111, at 117–21; Rose, supra note 128, at 2205–10 (arguing for 
federal government to have sole responsibility for deterring fraud at the national level). 
130. See James J. Park, Rules, Principles, and the Competition to Enforce the Securities Laws, 
100 CAL. L. REV. 115, 157 (2012) (noting the New York Attorney General’s enforcement actions of 
the 2000s against research analysts and the mutual fund industry); Amanda M. Rose, State 
Enforcement of National Policy: A Contextual Approach (with Evidence from the Securities Realm), 
97 MINN. L. REV. 1343, 1377 (2013) (“The wisdom of preserving a concurrent state securities fraud 
enforcement role vis-à-vis nationally traded firms has been hotly debated for over a decade now.”). 
131. See generally Strategic Planning, Resource Allocation and Crisis Management—Is the SEC 
Ready?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Gov’t Efficiency and Fin. Mgmt. of the Comm. on Gov’t 
Reform, 108th Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (2004) (statement of Richard J. Hillman, Director of Financial 
Markets and Community Investment, U.S. General Accounting Office). See also Mark Maremont & 
Deborah Solomon, Missed Chances: Behind SEC’s Failings: Caution, Tight Budget, ‘90s 
Exuberance, WALL ST. J., Dec. 24, 2003, at A1 (exploring the reasons for the SEC’s recent failures 
in securities enforcement); Jones, supra note 111, at 126–27 (“Because the SEC lacks adequate 
resources to effectively police the national securities market, supplemental enforcement is essential 
to achieve an appropriate level of deterrence.”). 
132. See Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 863, 885–88 (2006) 
(explaining how overlapping state–federal jurisdiction can help overcome regulatory inertia by 
creating a “fail-safe” system of redundancy that protects against under-regulation); John C. Coffee, 
Jr. & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury Have a Better Idea?, 95 VA. L. REV. 
707, 763–66 (2009) (noting that state regulators have incentives to prosecute fraud, are more 
stringent than the SEC, and often are faster than the SEC in investigating and prosecuting fraud); Jill 
E. Fisch, Top Cop or Regulatory Flop? The SEC at 75, 95 VA. L. REV. 785, 798 (2009) (“[R]ecent 
and continuing history of securities-related scandals and SEC failures offers little reason to cut back 
even minimally on state enforcement efforts.”); Rose, supra note 130, at 1348, 1361.  
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 Moreover, since state administrators are subject to 
political pressure, they may cater to their constituents by investigating 




Though the merits of state involvement in investigating and 
prosecuting securities violations that are “national” in character are 
debatable, there is greater consensus about the positive aspects of 
concurrent jurisdiction in enforcement at the local level. Setting aside 
the resource constraints the SEC faces,
135
 a state enforcer is likely to 
enjoy a comparative advantage relative to its federal counterparts in 
investigating small, local fraud.
136
 State enforcers, for example, are 
likely to have a better understanding of local conditions and have better 
access to the information necessary to detect instances of fraud and 
pursue a case against securities laws violators.
137
 Not surprisingly, state 
                                                     
133. See Amanda M. Rose & Larry J. LeBlanc, Policing Public Companies: An Empirical 
Examination of the Enforcement Landscape and the Role Played by State Securities Regulators, 65 
FLA. L. REV. 395, 396, 399 (2013) (finding that for U.S. companies listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange, state securities enforcement actions target mostly firms in the financial sector and 
misconduct implicating an industry-wide scandal, rather than firm-specific misbehavior, and that 
over ninety percent of these state actions were accompanied by a related federal action or 
investigation).  
134. See, e.g., Christopher R. Lane, Halting the March Toward Preemption: Resolving Conflicts 
Between State and Federal Securities Regulators, 39 NEW ENG. L. REV. 317, 339 (2005) (asserting 
that “Oklahoma . . . dropped criminal securities fraud charges against WorldCom in return for a 
promise by the company to create 1600 jobs in the state over the next ten years”); Park, supra note 
130, at 158–59; Rose, supra note 130, at 1403–06, 1411 (describing rent-seeking behavior of West 
Virginia’s securities regulators); Rose, supra note 130, at 1409–11 (finding that while some state 
actions against nationally traded firms have served to discipline the SEC, others can be 
characterized as rent-seeking). It is worth noting that the SEC is not necessarily immune from 
political pressure. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.  
135. See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 
89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 58 (2010) (“State AGs can . . . serve a valuable equalizing function by bringing 
enforcement actions when a federal agency shares the state’s outlook on regulation but lacks the 
resources to police all infractions.”); Johnson, supra note 115, at 195–96 (noting that the SEC lacks 
the resources to “police smaller private placements” and arguing that smaller private offerings 
should be “policed at the local level”). 
136. See Rose, supra note 130, at 1372 (“[A] federal enforcer might take the enforcement lead 
when it enjoys a comparative enforcement advantage relative to a state enforcer (such as a better 
ability to investigate crimes with a multistate dimension), and a state enforcer might step in when it 
has an advantage over the federal enforcer (such as when most of the witnesses and evidence are 
located within the state).”); Rose, supra note 128, at 2206 (“This formulation supports assigning the 
federal government responsibility for deterring fraud in the national securities markets, while 
assigning state governments responsibility for deterring fraud targeted at their respective local 
capital markets.”). 
137. See Rose, supra note 130, at 1357–58; Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal 
Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 698, 721 (2011) (observing that “[s]tates may have an investigatory or 
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regulators have historically focused their enforcement efforts on local, 




II. RECENT INNOVATIONS AT THE STATE LEVEL 
As highlighted in the prior section, the expansion of the universe of 
offerings that are exempt from registration at the federal level has left 
investors in small and local securities offerings outside the reach of the 
federal securities laws’ ex ante protective mechanisms. And, even 
though the general anti-fraud provisions of Rule 10b-5 apply to these 
transactions, in practice, the two principal mechanisms of ex post 
enforcement—private securities litigation and SEC enforcement 
actions—play a limited role in policing offerings that are small and local 
in nature. Complicating matters further for small investors, federal law 
has increasingly preempted the states’ ability to regulate the offering 
process. 
In light of these developments, states have focused their efforts on ex 
post (e.g., enforcement) rather than ex ante (e.g., registration) 
mechanisms to protect investors from securities fraud. To strengthen 
these ex post enforcement mechanisms in the past few decades, several 
states have expanded the authority of state securities administrators to 
obtain restitution on behalf of injured investors in civil actions, as well 
as in administrative proceedings.
139
 More recently, some states have 
established innovative insurance-type restitution funds that provide 
partial compensation to victims of securities fraud.
140
 This section 
identifies and explains these two recent innovations and provides an 
economic analysis of their policy implications. 
                                                     
enforcement apparatus in place . . . that would be costly for the federal government to replicate” and 
explaining that state enforcers “are likely to have a better understanding of local conditions than 
their federal counterparts, simply by virtue of living and working in the state”); NASAA to Obama: 
Limiting Preemption Protects Investors, NASAA INSIGHT (N. Am. Sec. Adm’rs Ass’n, Wash., 
D.C.), Spring/Summer 2009, at 1, http://www.nasaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/NASAA 
_Insight_Spring_Summer_2009_Online.pdf [https://perma.cc/47NK-HPVM] (stressing the role of 
state regulators in fraud detection given their “unique proximity to investors and to the industry 
participants within their state borders”) (quoting NASAA President and Colorado Sec. Comm’r. 
Fred Joseph). 
138. See Michael A. Perino, Fraud and Federalism: Preempting Private State Securities Fraud 
Causes of Action, 50 STAN. L. REV. 273, 279 (1998) (describing state regulators as “a local cop on 
the beat” with a “traditional consumer protection role”).  
139. See infra section II.A.1. 
140. See infra section II.B.1. 
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A. Expansion of Enforcement Powers of Securities Administrators 
The first major innovation or trend at the state level which holds 
potential for investor protection is state administrative enforcement. 
Although federal legislation has restricted the states’ ability to regulate 
the registration and qualification of securities prior to their sale, the 
authority and power of state securities administrators to police and 
investigate fraud, including the type of remedies that the administrator 
may seek to obtain (e.g., restitution or disgorgement) and the forum in 
which it may do so (e.g., civil court or administrative proceeding), are 
determined by state law.
141
 These represent significant levers for states 
to deter and punish fraud. As the discussion below illustrates, states have 
increasingly taken advantage of these levers by expanding the ex post 
enforcement powers of securities administrators. 
1. Historical Development 
The Uniform Securities Act of 1956 (USA (1956)) afforded 
administrators limited statutory power to pursue civil or administrative 
actions against violators of a state’s securities laws.142 The original text 
itself did not even authorize the administrator to issue a cease-and-desist 
order; rather, the administrator had to file a civil action in state court to 
obtain any type of injunctive relief against violations of the state 
securities laws.
143
 And such injunctive relief was the only remedy the 
administrator could obtain in a civil action—state securities 
administrators lacked the authority to bring a lawsuit in civil court 
                                                     
141. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. Investigations by securities administrators can 
lead to three possible outcomes: a criminal action, a civil action, or an administrative proceeding. 
See ALAN R. BROMBERG, LEWIS D. LOWENFELS & MICHAEL J. SULLIVAN, 6 BROMBERG & 
LOWENFELS ON SECURITIES FRAUD §§ 12:240-242 (2d ed. 2015).  
142. See UNIF. SEC. ACT § 603, cmt. 1 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 
1985). The original text from 1956 reads as follows:  
Whenever it appears to the [Administrator] that any person has engaged or is about to engage 
in any act or practice constituting a violation of any provision of this act or any rule or order 
hereunder, [he] may in [his] discretion bring an action in the [insert name of appropriate court] 
to enjoin the acts or practices and to enforce compliance with this act or any rule or order 
hereunder. Upon a proper showing a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or 
writ of mandamus shall be granted and a receiver or conservator may be appointed for the 
defendant or the defendant’s assets. The court may not require the [Administrator] to post a 
bond.  
UNIF. SEC. ACT § 408 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 1956); Blue Sky 
L. Rep. P¶ 5548 (C.C.H.), 2009 WL 2996912. 
143.  See BROMBERG ET AL., supra note 141, § 12:241. 
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against those violating the securities laws to obtain civil penalties or any 
other ancillary relief, including restitution for the victims.
144
 
In the decades following the drafting of USA (1956), several states 
that adopted the model act expanded the ability of their securities 
administrators to pursue remedies against securities laws violators by 
authorizing them to sue in civil court to obtain civil penalties or even 
restitution on behalf of injured investors.
145
 The text of the subsequent 
model code, the Uniform Securities Act of 1985 (USA (1985)), reflected 
this trend. Under USA (1985), a state securities administrator may file a 
civil action and obtain a court ordered civil penalty, as well as restitution 
for injured investors or any other remedy the court considers just.
146
 
Currently, there are forty-three states that allow their securities 
administrators to file civil suits seeking restitution or disgorgement on 
behalf of injured investors.
147
 
The ability of state securities administrators to employ administrative 
actions as a vehicle to police and investigate fraud has also been 
enhanced in recent years. Under the original text of USA (1956), state 
securities administrators did not even have the authority to issue a cease-
and-desist order as the result of an administrative proceeding.
148
 As with 
the range of remedies available to securities administrators in civil 
actions, several states experimented with further expanding the authority 
of their securities administrators by granting them the power to issue 
cease-and-desist orders in administrative proceedings.
149
 By the time 
                                                     
144. See UNIF. SEC. ACT § 603 cmt. 1 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 
2002).  
145. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 59.255(4)(a) (2015) (court may award “if the court finds that 
enforcement of the rights of such persons by private civil action, whether by class action or 
otherwise, would be so burdensome or expensive as to be impractical”); 70 PA. STAT. AND CONS. 
STAT. ANN. § 1-509(b) (West 2014) (similar); and WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.390(4) (1974) 
(similar).  
146. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 603(a)(1) (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 
1985). A 1987 amendment to the USA (1956) enhanced the powers of securities administrators and 
expanded the remedies administrators may pursue in civil court against persons who have engaged 
in violations of the securities laws to include “an order of rescission, restitution or disgorgement.” 
UNIF. SEC. ACT § 408(b) (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 1956) (as 
amended). See Blue Sky L. Rep. P¶ 5548 (C.C.H.), 2009 WL 2996912. 
147. See infra Table 1.  
148. See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
149. See, e.g., CALIF. CORP. CODE § 25532(a) (2017); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 517.221(1) (West 
2009). In addition, administrative proceedings can result in denial, suspension, or revocation of a 
broker-dealer or investment adviser license or of a registration of securities. See BROMBERG ET AL., 
supra note 141, § 12:240.  
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USA (1985) was drafted,
150
 a large number of state securities 
administrators had the authority to issue cease-and-desist orders, either 
by amendment to their state’s USA (1956) version or through the 
corresponding state’s administrative procedure law.151 Reflecting the 
legislative trend at the time,
152
 USA (1985) empowered administrators to 
issue cease-and-desist orders
153
 and granted them the authority to impose 
civil penalties, subject to statutory ceilings.
154
 The most recent model 
act, the Uniform Securities Act of 2002 (USA (2002)) tracked these 
developments.
155
 Like USA (1985), USA (2002) allows state securities 
administrators to file a civil action to obtain civil penalties, restitution, or 
other relief as the court considers appropriate, including rescission and 
disgorgement.
156
 Under USA (2002), the state securities administrator 
                                                     
150. Highlighting the increasing authority of administrators, USA (1985) contains two different 
sections: one dealing with administrative remedies and one dealing with civil remedies. See UNIF. 
SEC. ACT §§ 602, 603 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 1985). These two 
sections replaced a single section in USA (1956). See UNIF. SEC. ACT § 408 (NAT’L CONFERENCE 
OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 1956). 
151. See UNIF. SEC. ACT § 602, cmt. 1 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 
1985). However, most state securities administrators lacked the authority to impose civil penalties. 
Id. 
152. USA (1985) sought to increase the administrative remedies available to administrators to 
provide them greater flexibility in imposing sanctions. See id. 
153. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 602(b)(1). While USA (1956) was adopted by 37 states, few adopted USA 
(1985). See Joel Seligman, The New Uniform Securities Act, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 243, 243 (2003); 
Richard B. Smith, A New Uniform Securities Act, 6 No. 9 GLWSLAW 8, at 2 (Westlaw) (Feb. 
2003). Currently, only four states have a version of USA (1985) in effect. See Legislative Enactment 
Status Securities Act, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION (1988), 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title= Securities%20Act%20  
[https://perma.cc/PK8Z-UHH9].  
154. See UNIF. SEC. ACT § 604(d). Under USA (1985), the securities administrator may impose a 
civil penalty of up to $2,500 for a single violation or $25,000 for multiple violations in one or more 
related proceedings. Id. § 602(b)(4). The maximum amounts, however, vary by state. See, e.g., N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 421-B:23 (2015) ($2,500 per violation and $5,000 aggregate); WIS. STATS. § 
551.603(2)(b)(3) (2016) ($5,000 per violation and $250,000 aggregate); MO. REV. STAT. § 409.6-
603 (2016) ($10,000 per violation and $1,000,000 aggregate). 
155. To date, nineteen jurisdictions have adopted USA (2002). See Legislative Fact Sheet 
Securities Act, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION,  http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx? 
title=Securities%20Act [https://perma.cc/PNK3-NKSQ].  
156. UNIF. SEC. ACT §§ 603(b)(2)(C), (b)(3). According to the drafters of the model act, section 
603 follows USA (1985) in “broadening the civil remedies available when the administrator 
believes that a violation has occurred” in order to “enable administrators to better tailor appropriate 
sanctions to particular misconduct.” § 603 cmt. 1. 
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may also issue cease-and-desist orders
157
 or, following an administrative 
hearing, impose a civil penalty.
158
 
Although USA (1985) and USA (2002) expanded the remedies that 
securities administrators could pursue in administrative proceedings, 
such remedies were still more limited than those that a court could 
impose upon request by the administrator.
159
 Notably, although the state 
securities administrator could impose a civil fine as a result of an 
administrative proceeding, it could not order restitution on behalf of an 
injured investor (although it could request a court to do so in a civil 
case).
160
 In recent years, a number of states have amended their laws on 
an individual basis to empower their securities administrators to issue 
orders requiring defendants to pay restitution.
161
 States began to 
empower their administrators in this manner during the late 1980s and 
with time, more states amended their laws to grant this authority to their 
securities administrators.
162
 There are now twenty-one states that have 
authorized their securities administrators to order restitution as a result 
of an administrative proceeding.
163
 
2. Economic Assessment 
a. Policy Implications 
One of the policy trends identified above is the increase in the amount 
of monetary damages (whether in the form of civil penalties or a 
restitution order) that state securities administrators may obtain in civil 
and administrative actions against violators of the state’s securities laws. 
This increase should incentivize an administrator to investigate a greater 
number of securities fraud cases.
164
 
                                                     
157. § 604(a)(1).  
158. § 604(d). The administrator may also charge the costs associated with the investigation and 
proceedings in the final order. § 604(e).  
159. See supra notes 14647, 15254, 15658 and accompanying text. 
160. See supra notes 15658 and accompanying text.  
161. See infra notes 16263 and accompanying text. 
162. Arizona made the corresponding amendment to its securities laws in 1986. See ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. Ch. 220, § 5 (1986). Delaware and Massachusetts followed suit in 1990 and 1991, 
respectively. See Delaware Laws Ch. 274, H.B. No. 444 (1990) and 1991 Mass. Legis. Serv. Ch. 
490 (H.B. 3354). 
163. See infra Table 1. The latest state to have amended its laws to this end was California in 
2013. 2013 Cal. Legis. Serv. 2660(4) (S.B. 538). 
164. This conclusion follows if the benefits that the administrator may obtain from commencing 
an action have increased by an amount larger than any increase in the costs that the administrator 
would have to incur to secure those additional benefits. For an overview of administrators’ incentive 
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From society’s perspective, an increase in the number of actions 
pursued by state administrators presents benefits as well as costs. An 
increase in both the size and probability of a potential penalty could, at 
the margin, deter a greater number of fraudsters from violating the 
securities laws.
165
 Moreover, in those instances where fraud is not 
deterred, investors may be more likely to receive some compensation for 
their losses, at least in the states that allow the securities administrator to 
collect damages on their behalf.
166
 But there are also potential costs that 
should be considered. Not only will the administrator have to spend 
more resources in commencing and pursuing those additional actions, 
but those accused of violating the securities laws will also incur costs in 
establishing their defense. And maintaining the forum in which such 
actions, whether judicial (civil courts) or administrative (administrative 
courts), are resolved is costly as well.
167
 These social costs would be 
exacerbated if the administrator has the incentive to bring numerous or 
unmeritorious actions that are politically motivated, as this could have a 
chilling effect on capital formation for smaller companies.
168
 
The second, and more notable, trend identified above is the increase 
in the remedies that state securities administrators may pursue in 
administrative proceedings. Historically, administrators could only 
obtain certain types of monetary damages, such as disgorgement and 
fines in civil actions; however, in recent years more states have allowed 
administrators to recover these type of damages in administrative 
actions.
169
 If pursuing a case administratively is more cost-effective and 
less time-consuming than pursuing a similar case in state court, the 
bridging of this gap should lead to a higher number of civil and 
administrative actions pursued by securities administrators.
170
 First, 
                                                     
to seek monetary penalties, see Margaret H. Lemos and Max Minzner, For-Profit Public 
Enforcement, 127 HARV. L. REV. 853, 856–57 (2014) (arguing that public enforcement agencies 
may seek higher monetary penalties to further deterrence, enhance the administrator’s reputation, or 
supplement the agency’s budget when allowed to retain the recovered funds). 
165. See infra note 267 and accompanying text. 
166. For a description of existing investor compensation programs, see infra section II.B.1.b and 
section II.B.1.c. 
167. See infra note 174 and accompanying text. 
168. If the state administrator is subject to political pressure it may have the incentive to bring 
numerous actions to increase its prestige or bring meritless suits in the hopes that the defendant 
chooses to settle to avoid a costly proceeding. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
169. See supra notes 14858 and accompanying text. 
170. See supra notes 9495 and accompanying text. This effect will be even stronger if securities 
administrators believe that they have a higher probability of success in administrative actions 
compared to civil actions. See supra notes 8284 and accompanying text. 
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instead of bringing a particular case in state court, the administrator may 
choose instead to pursue that case in an administrative proceeding. 
Second, there may be cases that the administrator does not find 
economically justifiable to bring in state court, but that may now be 
economically feasible to pursue in an administrative proceeding.
171
 
By increasing the likelihood of a wrongdoer receiving a penalty, such 
additional actions could enhance the deterrent effect of the securities 
laws. Moreover, in the cases in which restitution is ordered, victims are 
also more likely to receive compensation. Thus, at a first glance, 
enhancing the authority of state administrators in this manner appears to 
promote the goals of deterrence and compensation. There are, however, 
potential monetary and non-monetary costs associated with such 
increased use of administrative proceedings, which are discussed next. 
b. Lessons from the SEC’s Recent Experience 
The growing ability of state administrators to seek ancillary remedies 
in civil court, and more recently, to order restitution in administrative 
proceedings, parallels the rising role of SEC administrative actions in 
securities law enforcement at the federal level.
172
 These recent 
developments at the federal level can provide valuable insights as to the 
likely results of such expansion of administrative power at the state 
level. The SEC’s response to the expansion of its administrative powers 
does suggest that state administrators are likely to bring an increasing 
number of administrative actions.
173
 Moreover, the SEC’s experience 
also highlights two potential concerns associated with such increased 
frequency in administrative actions: (1) monetary costs associated with 
maintaining administrative courts, and (2) the perception of fairness in 
administrative proceedings. 
Although the costs for the SEC to bring an action in an administrative 
court may be lower, maintaining that specialized administrative court in 
the first place is expensive; and to preserve the quality and expediency 
of the system, the number of judges needs to increase in tandem with a 
                                                     
171. See Stephen J. Choi and A.C. Pritchard, The SEC’s Shift to Administrative Proceedings: An 
Empirical Assessment, 34 YALE J. REG. 1, 25–31 (2017). 
172. See supra notes 86100 and accompanying text. More generally, these developments also 
touch upon the growing literature analyzing large-scale compensation efforts by federal 
administrative agencies and state attorney generals. See, e.g., Velikonja, supra note 89, at 337–38; 
Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio & Adam S. Zimmerman, The Agency Class Action, 112 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1992, 201314 (2012); Adam S. Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 500, 
527 (2011). 
173. See supra notes 9394 and accompanying text. 
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 Given the volume of the SEC’s workload, those 
costs may be reasonable. This calculus, however, may be different for 
individual states with a lighter workload that may not justify the fixed 
costs associated with maintaining a specialized court.
175
 Thus, even if 
state securities administrators would enjoy the same benefits associated 
with administrative proceedings, one may be concerned whether they 
would be able to find the personnel to staff such a specialized court and 
whether the costs of operating such courts would be prohibitive (or at 
least offset any efficiency gains). Of course, states do not need to have 
specialized securities courts and could employ the more general 
administrative courts established under the states’ administrative 
procedure acts. But then, some of the benefits associated with 
administrative proceedings would not be fully enjoyed. 
Another open question is the extent to which administrative 
proceedings can be fair to defendants, an issue that has led a number of 
defendants to challenge in federal court the decisions by the SEC to 
pursue actions against them before an administrative judge.
176
 
Defendants have argued that administrative actions unfairly deny them 
important protections afforded by the federal courts and have questioned 
the relative fairness of the system, noting that SEC judges appear biased 
toward the agency.
177
 Not only are judges appointed by the SEC, but 
they have their offices in the SEC headquarters, which exposes them to 
                                                     
174. During the year 2014, the SEC added two new administrative law judges, bringing the 
number of judges at the time to five. Moreover, for the fiscal year 2015 the budget for the 
administrative law judge’s office rose forty-four percent to $2.5 million. See Eaglesham, supra note 
94. 
175. Even though bringing an administrative action appears to be more economical than a civil 
suit from the administrator’s perspective, those savings may be offset by the higher costs associated 
with maintaining the administrative court relative to just increasing the capacity of the existing civil 
court system.  
176. See, e.g., Jean Eaglesham, Federal Judge Deals Another Blow to SEC Administrative Court, 
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 5, 2015), http://on.wsj.com/1QpGmtE [https://perma.cc/8K96-K5GF] 
(describing a Georgia federal court decision); Jean Eaglesham, Federal Judge Rules SEC In-House 
Judges ‘Likely Unconstitutional’, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 12, 2015), http://on.wsj.com/1QpGHwn 
[https://perma.cc/QA8K-GKGY] (describing a New York federal court decision); Jean Eaglesham, 
Judge Adds to Pressure on SEC over How It Names Its Judges, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 3, 2015), 
http://on.wsj.com/1QpDjld [https://perma.cc/5MC5-ZEJC] (describing a New York federal court 
decision). 
177. See Eaglesham, The SEC Fights Challenges to Its In-House Courts, supra note 83. Thus far, 
these challenges have met with little success at the appellate level. See Aruna Viswanatha, Appeals 
Court Upholds SEC’s In-House Court as Constitutional, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 9, 2016), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/appeals-court-upholds-secs-in-house-court-as-constitutional-
1470766508 [https://perma.cc/P34X-YFFV]. 
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pressure and raises questions regarding the judges’ objectivity.178 
Moreover, appeals of rulings rendered by the SEC’s administrative law 
judges are heard by the five SEC Commissioners and reversals are not 
common.
179
 It is hard to assess how big a problem this would be in the 
context of state administrative actions. State securities administrators 
generally do not wield the power that the SEC does and decisions by 
administrative judges would be reviewed by the state appellate courts, 
not the state securities administrator itself.
180
 
c. Potential Solutions 
The states’ challenge in funding these specialized administrative 
courts and promoting their political independence could be addressed by 
a set of specialized administrative courts supported by multiple states. 
Such specialized courts would apply the laws of the relevant jurisdiction 
and its decisions would be subject to appeal to the corresponding state’s 
appellate court. There are several tangible benefits associated with such 
a system. First, this system would allow the states to share the fixed 
costs of maintaining a specialized administrative court dealing with 
matters involving securities laws.
181
 Second, the judges in these 
administrative courts would be exposed to a more diverse set of cases, 
thus gaining more specialized knowledge and expertise. Third, these 
                                                     
178. Recent empirical analyses suggest that this may not be a trivial concern. According to an 
analysis by the Wall Street Journal, the SEC won 90% of the time before its own judges in 
contested cases between October 2010 and March 2015, substantially higher than the 69% success 
rate enjoyed by the SEC in federal court over the same period. See Eaglesham, SEC Wins With In-
House Judges, supra note 80. This success rate probably underestimates the administrative court 
effectiveness, as it is also likely to provide incentives for defendants to settle. See Eaglesham, 
Fairness of SEC Judges in Spotlight, supra note 80 (reporting an instance where a SEC judge told 
defendants that he had never ruled against the SEC’s enforcement division). It is worth noting that 
these are raw figures and that the Wall Street Journal’s analysis does not control for differences in 
the characteristics of cases resolved in each type of forum. A more recent and rigorous study finds 
no evidence that the SEC is more likely to prevail in administrative actions. See Velikonja, supra 
note 85, at 34849. 
179. According to the Wall Street Journal Study, commissioner outcomes favored the SEC in 
fifty-three of fifty-six cases—or 95%—from January 2010 through March 2015. See Eaglesham, 
supra note 94.  
180. The position of securities administrators within the government structure varies from state to 
state. In some states the securities administrator is supervised by the attorney general’s office, in 
others, by the secretary of state and, in others, by the department of corporations, banking, or 
finance. For a list of state securities administrators, see Contact Your Regulator, NASAA,  
http://www.nasaa.org/about-us/contact-us/contact-your-regulator [https://perma.cc/TG48-F6MW]. 
181. Some large states, such as California and New York, for example, would not need to enter 
this type of arrangement, as their caseload possibly justifies maintaining a sophisticated specialized 
court. Smaller states, however, could potentially benefit from such an arrangement.  
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judges may be more easily insulated from political pressure (though this 
will certainly depend on how they are appointed), assuaging defendants’ 
concerns about fairness. Finally, such a system may help in maintaining 
the uniformity across states that has been achieved by the adoption of the 
uniform securities acts. 
States could choose to work together based on geographical proximity 
and similarity in their securities laws. Although such enterprise may 
require amendments to the securities laws and administrative procedural 
acts of participating states, there is no reason to believe that this would 
be unfeasible. The adoption of the different versions of the uniform 
securities acts has led to uniformity in state law, which facilitates this 
regulatory harmonization process.
182
 And state administrators have 
effectively cooperated on a number of fronts. For example, the states, 
with the support of the North American Securities Administrators 
Association, have created a voluntary coordinated review program that 
facilitates and expedites the process for issuers who need to make filings 
with multiple state securities regulators as part of a securities offering.
183
 
And, more generally, states have a long history of entering into interstate 
compacts and interstate administrative agreements, as well as delegating 
rule-making authority to interstate administrative agencies to address 
and efficiently solve common problems.
184
 
B. State Restitution Funds as a Vehicle for Investor Compensation 
As noted, victims of securities fraud may be unable to recover their 
losses for a number of reasons.
185
 Going to court may not be 
economically viable given the relatively high costs associated with 
                                                     
182. See supra section II.A.1. 
183. COORDINATED REVIEW, http://www.coordinatedreview.org [https://perma.cc/592S-MNXZ], 
provides an overview of this program. NASAA has been promoting this program to facilitate the 
use of Tier 1 Regulation A+ offerings, which, unlike Tier 2 offerings, require registration at the state 
level. See supra notes 54–55, 123 and accompanying text. 
184. See, e.g., Robert Agranoff, Intergovernmental Policy Management: Cooperative Practices 
in Federal Systems, in THE DYNAMICS OF FEDERALISM IN NATIONAL AND SUPRANATIONAL 
POLITICAL SYSTEMS 248, 269–71 (Michael A. Pagano & Robert Leonardi eds., 2007) (describing 
interstate compacts and interstate administrative agreements); FREDERICK L. ZIMMERMANN & 
MITCHELL WENDELL, THE LAW AND USE OF INTERSTATE COMPACTS 44 (Council of State Gov’ts 
1976) (describing the use of interstate compacts and their application to the field of state services); 
JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, INTERSTATE COOPERATION: COMPACTS AND ADMINISTRATIVE 
AGREEMENTS 217–35 (2d ed. 2012) (assessing the success of interstate compacts and administrative 
agreements); Patricia S. Florestano, Past and Present Utilization of Interstate Compacts in the 
United States, 25 PUBLIUS 13, 18–23 (1994) (describing historical developments in the use of 
interstate compacts). 
185. See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text. 
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bringing a lawsuit, the probability of losing, and the relatively small 
amounts of money involved. And, even if an investor prevails, the 
defendant may be judgment proof (i.e., does not have sufficient personal 
assets to satisfy a judgment) or the costs of enforcing and satisfying the 
judgment may be just too high. Administrative enforcement of anti-fraud 
laws is one way of dealing with the first problem—the state can bring an 
action and absorb the costs even if the defendant is judgment proof to 
the extent that pursuing such action deters future violations of the law.
186
 
However, it does not, by itself, address the investor’s lack of 
compensation problem. 
To address this second problem, and mitigate the social costs of 
securities fraud, certain states have established insurance-type programs 
to assist victims of securities fraud and allow them to obtain 
compensation and recover part of their losses. This development, much 
like the increased use of administrative actions discussed earlier, mirrors 
the increased use by the SEC of fair funds to compensate injured 
investors.
187
 In 2010, Indiana became the first state to adopt legislation 
creating a special fund to provide restitution to victims of securities 
fraud.
188
 Montana followed suit in 2011, establishing a similar 
program.
189
 The Montana and Indiana programs, which are described 
later in this section, appear to be an extension of an investor 
compensation program established in Florida almost forty years ago, 
which is discussed next.
190
 
                                                     
186. See Polinsky, supra note 68, at 107 (arguing that enforcement by a public agent may occur 
even when potential penalties are lower than the enforcement costs due to the value of deterring 
future violations); Steven Shavell, The Social Versus the Private Incentive to Bring Suit in a Costly 
Legal System, 21 J. LEGAL. STUD. 333, 333–34 (1982) (noting that bringing lawsuits may produce 
externalities, such as deterrence, which are not taken into account by private plaintiffs); Luis A. 
Aguilar, Speech at the 20th Annual Sec. Litig. and Reg. Enf’t Seminar: A Stronger Enforcement 
Program to Enhance Investor Protection, https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2013-spch102513laa 
[https://perma.cc/NR7R-VYLZ] (noting the value of deterrence in the enforcement of securities 
laws). Moreover, the state may derive value from non-monetary remedies available to it, such as 
injunctive relief, as it may prevent future investors from being harmed by the same perpetrator. See 
supra note 149. This is not the case for individual plaintiffs (or their attorneys) for whom the 
benefits associated with a lawsuit are likely to be mainly monetary.  
187. See supra notes 97–100 and accompanying text. 
188. See Press Release, Ind. Sec. State, Securities Restitution Fund Will Be First of Its Kind for 
Indiana and Nation (Mar. 18, 2010), http://www.in.gov/sos/3587.htm [https://perma.cc/2YF9-
H93K]. For a summary of the Indiana program, see infra notes 202–11 and accompanying text. 
189. See infra notes 21321 and accompanying text. 
190. Kansas also considered enacting a similar program in 2012. See infra notes 223–24 and 
accompanying text. 
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1. Historical Development 
a. Florida’s Securities Guaranty Fund 
The Securities Guaranty Fund (SGF) was created as part of the 
enactment of the Florida Securities Act of 1978 to assist victims of 
securities laws violations.
191
 The SGF is funded by a portion of the 
assessment fees paid by dealers and investment advisors as part of their 
initial registration or renewal applications.
192
 Investors that have 
obtained a court judgment against a licensed dealer or investment 
advisor as a result of a transaction involving the sale of unregistered 
securities or securities fraud are eligible to seek recovery from the 
SGF.
193
 Prior to pursuing a claim with the SGF, the investor must take 
reasonable steps to verify that the judgment debtor possesses no assets 
that could be sold or applied in satisfaction of the judgment.
194
 An 
investor may apply to and receive from the SGF an amount equal to the 
unsatisfied portion of the investor’s judgment or $10,000, whichever is 
less.
195
 However, the payments of claims against any one dealer or 
investment adviser are limited in the aggregate to $100,000—if total 
claims exceed this limit, the SGF must prorate the payments to the 
harmed investors.
196
 To allow the fund to ascertain whether the $100,000 
cap will be binding for a particular set of claims, investors must wait two 
years from the date any claimant is found to be eligible for recovery 




As discussed earlier, the effectiveness of private enforcement of anti-
fraud laws is limited by the fact that certain defendants may be judgment 
                                                     
191. FLA. STAT. §§ 517.131, 517.141 (2015). The SGF bears some resemblance to the Securities 
Investment Protection Corporation (SIPC), a broker-dealer membership corporation created by the 
U.S. Congress in 1970 that acts as an insurer of funds and securities in customer accounts held at 
insolvent or financially troubled broker-dealers. See J. B. Grossman, Preference Determination 
Concerning Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 and Securities Act of 1933, Securities and Exchange 
Act of 1934, and Commodity Exchange Act, 27 UALR L. REV. 533, 537 (2005). The SIPC is funded 
by fees assessed on all its members. See Roberta S. Karmel, Should Securities Industry Self-
Regulatory Organizations Be Considered Government Agencies?, 14 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 151, 
162–63 (2008). For an overview of the SIPC and its activities, see SEC. INVESTOR PROTECTION 
CORP., 2015 ANNUAL REPORT 4 (Apr. 29, 2016). 
192. § 517.131(1)(a). 
193. §§ 517.131(2), 517.07, 517.301. 
194. § 517.131(3). 
195. § 517.141(1). 
196. § 517.141(2).  
197. § 517.141(3).  
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proof, which may delay and increase the costs for an injured investor to 
collect an award.
198
 Thus, certain investors who prevail at trial may end 
up receiving little or no compensation for their losses, which decreases 
investors’ incentive to bring a lawsuit in the first place. This, in turn, 
reduces the deterrent effect of the securities laws on promoters (and the 
broker dealers who assist them) by reducing the costs associated with 
fraudulent activities. By guaranteeing investors that prevail in court a 
minimum recovery, a program such as the SGF could provide investors 
not only with partial compensation for the losses, but also with 
additional incentives to incur the expenses associated with bringing a 
lawsuit. 
From an investor’s perspective, the SGF has certain noteworthy 
drawbacks. Investors may only recover in situations where the fraud is 
committed by a dealer or investment advisor and, even then, recovery is 
capped at $10,000 (or even less if the total claims against the defendant 
are more than $100,000).
199
 Before submitting a claim against the fund, 
the investor must first obtain a court judgment and try to satisfy that 
judgment against the defendant’s assets.200 This means that the investor 
will have to spend time and money on court-related expenses (e.g., 
attorney fees), which can be a risky proposition, particularly in light of 
the limited recovery available under the SGF. And, even then, investors 
must wait two years before being able to receive compensation.
201
 These 
factors decrease the net compensation that investors may expect to 
receive from the fund, reducing their incentive to bring a lawsuit against 
persons violating securities laws. 
b. Indiana’s Securities Restitution Fund 
In recent years, states have begun to experiment with investor 
compensation programs that are more comprehensive than Florida’s 
SGF. In 2010, Indiana enacted legislation establishing a special fund 
aimed at providing restitution for victims of securities fraud.
202
 To be 
eligible, an investor must have suffered monetary loss as a result of a 
“[s]ecurities violation” (which is broadly defined)203 and have a court or 
                                                     
198. See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text. 
199. §§ 517.131(2), 517.141(1). 
200. § 517.131(2). 
201. § 517.141(3). 
202. P.L. 114-2010 § 12 (codified at IND. CODE § 23-20 (2015)). 
203. IND. CODE § 23-20-1-6. The term “[s]ecurities violation” is broadly defined to include a 
violation of the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Investment 
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administrative agency order awarding restitution to the investor.
204
 If the 
securities violation occurred outside Indiana, residents of Indiana might 
still recover from the fund if the jurisdiction in which the securities 
violation occurred does not offer them comparable assistance.
205
 
Notably, nonresidents who are victims of a securities violation 
committed in Indiana are also eligible if the jurisdiction in which the 
victim resides offers Indiana residents comparable assistance.
206
 If the 
party that was ordered to pay restitution has not paid the amount in full, 
the investor may apply to receive a payment from the fund.
207
 Eligible 
victims may receive an award equal to the lesser of twenty-five percent 
of the amount of the out-of-pocket loss or $15,000.
208
 
The fund was established with an initial $2 million endowment from 
fines paid by defendants to the Indiana Securities Division and five 
percent of the amounts collected for the securities division’s 
enforcement account, which includes costs of investigation and civil 
penalties recovered in cases of securities violations.
209
 Thus, it does not 
directly depend on any general tax revenues, though arguably it 
indirectly consumes resources that would otherwise have gone to the 
state general funds.
210
 The first payment from the Securities Restitution 
Fund, in the amount of $15,000, was awarded to an investor who lost 
                                                     
Company Act of 1940, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, the Indiana Uniform Securities Act 
(IND. CODE § 23-19) and any rules or regulations promulgated under any of those acts. § 23-20-1-6. 
204. §§ 23-20-1-9, 23-20-1-16(b)(1), 23-20-1-17. The order awarding restitution must have been 
issued following the adjudication of the underlying securities violation in a state or federal court, or 
a regulatory agency administrative proceeding. § 23-20-1-16(a). 
205. § 23-20-1-11(1).  
206. § 23-20-1-11(2).  
207. §§ 23-20-1-9, 23-20-1-16(b)(2). The victim must file an application within 180 days from 
the date of the order that entitles the victim to restitution. § 23-20-1-12(b). 
208. § 23-20-1-23. The term “out-of-pocket loss” is defined as an amount equal to the restitution 
ordered by the underlying court or administrative final order. § 23-20-1-4. 
209. §§ 23-20-1-25(b)(2), 23-19-6-1(h). If the amount of money in the fund drops below 
$250,000, the securities administrator must suspend payments for that month and the following two 
months. § 23-20-1-28(a). If after this suspension period the fund would be exhausted by payment in 
full of the suspended claims, then the amount paid to each claimant must be prorated. § 23-20-1-
28(b).  
210. For a discussion of the opportunity costs of these investor restitution programs see infra 
section II.B.3.b(2). Moreover, if the fund did not have enough money to satisfy all claims for an 
extended period of time, it is possible the general assembly could appropriate funds derived from 
tax revenues for the restitution program. § 23-20-1-25(b)(2). 
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 As of December 2016, the Indiana Securities Restitution 
Fund had made nearly $550,000 in restitution payments.
212
 
c. Montana’s Securities Assistance Restitution Fund 
In 2011, following Indiana’s footsteps, Montana established the 
Securities Restitution Assistance Fund (SRAF)
213
 to provide partial 
compensation to victims awarded restitution in a final order issued by 
the commissioner or in a final order in a legal action initiated by the 
commissioner, but who have not yet received the full amount of 
restitution.
214
 Montana’s program is narrower than Indiana’s in the sense 
that it only covers securities transactions in Montana that violate 
Montana law
215
 and only Montana residents are eligible for assistance, 
but it does provide a more generous compensation cap.
216
 An eligible 
victim may receive from the fund an award equal to the lesser of 
$25,000 or twenty-five percent of the amount of unpaid restitution.
217
 If 
the victim qualifies as a “[v]ulnerable person” the maximum award is 




                                                     
211. See Chris O’Malley, Investor Reimbursement Fund Off to Slow Start, INDIANAPOLIS BUS. J. 
(Aug. 2, 2014), http://www.ibj.com/articles/48823-investor-reimbursement-fund-off-to-slow-start 
[https://perma.cc/6F66-H7UX].  
212. See Press Release, Ind. Sec. State, Victims of Securities Fraud Receive $56,250 in 
Restitution Fund Awards From the Indiana Secretary of State’s Office Made Possible by the 
Secretary of State’s Securities Restitution Fund (Dec. 22, 2016), http://www.in.gov/activecalendar/ 
EventList.aspx?view=EventDetails&eventidn=255324&information_id=253745 
[https://perma.cc/LJ3B-BDBS]. 
213. 2011 Mont. Laws 207 (codified in MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-10-1001–30-10-1008 (2015)). 
214. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-10-1002; 30-10-1003(1)–(6).  
215. The term “[s]ecurities violation” includes violation of Montana’s securities act and any 
related administrative rules. § 30-10-1003(5). Indiana residents who were victims of securities fraud 
in other jurisdictions are eligible for restitution under the Indiana program. IND. CODE § 23-20-1-
11(1)(B) (2015). 
216. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-10-1005. Under Indiana’s program certain non-residents may be 
eligible for restitution assistance. IND. CODE § 23-20-1-11(2). 
217. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-10-1006(3). If the SRAF’s balance falls under $1 million, the 
commissioner must use an established loss ratio to determine how much money a person may 
receive. MONT. COMM’R. OF SEC. & INS. RULES 6.10.702-703. However, a recent amendment to the 
program has made this scenario less likely. See infra notes 219–20 and accompanying text.  
218. This was part of an amendment to the program enacted in 2015. 2015 Mont. Laws 86 
(codified in MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-10-1006(4)). A “[v]ulnerable person” is defined as a person 
who: (a) is at least sixty years old; (b) suffers from mental impairment because of a condition 
typically related to advanced age (such as dementia or memory loss); or (c) has a developmental 
disability. § 30-10-1003(7).  
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Originally, the fund was to be financed by contributions from 
individuals who had violated certain provisions of the Montana 
Securities Act.
219
 Subsequent legislation made public funds available to 
the SRAF by temporarily authorizing the deposit of a percentage of 
securities registration, filing or renewal fees into the SRAF.
220
 The first 
payment from Montana’s SRAF, in the amount of $13,750, was made in 
July 2012 to Reece Cobeen, who had invested $55,000 in notes offered 
and sold purportedly to help rebuild homes in Louisiana after Hurricane 
Katrina, and which promised a twenty-four percent annual return.
221
 As 
of June 2016, the Montana Securities Restitution Fund had distributed 




d. Other State Efforts 
Although no other state has yet followed Montana and Indiana’s 
footsteps, some states have considered establishing similar programs. In 
2012, the Office of the Kansas Securities Commissioner introduced 
legislation that would have created a securities restitution fund 
administered by the administrator to provide restitution to Kansas 
residents who have been awarded damages in connection with violations 
of Kansas’s securities laws and regulations.223 The proposed legislation 
was vague in the details, granting the commissioner broad authority to 
adopt rules to specify definitions, forms, procedures, and limitations for 
payment of restitution awards from the fund.
224
 Kansas’s assembly never 
enacted this proposed legislation. In 2013, New Hampshire considered 
establishing a restitution fund to compensate investors who lost money 
in a major fraudulent scheme but never adopted the measure.
225
 
                                                     
219. §§ 30-10-1004(2)(a)(i), (ii).  
220. 2013 Mont. Laws 137. This additional funding is scheduled to end on June 30, 2017.  
221. See supra Introduction. 
222. See Press Release, Office of the Mont. State Auditor, Comm’r of Sec. & Ins., Lindeen 
Announces Restitution for Montana Fraud Victims (June 15, 2016), http://csimt.gov/news/ 
hurricane-relief-scam-victim-receives-restitution [https://perma.cc/6YEN-9SKT]. 
223. 2012 Kan. Sess. Laws S.B. No. 349 § 4(f); 2012 Kan. Sess. Laws H.B. No. 2582 § 5(f). 
224. S.B. No. 349 § 5. 
225. 2013 N.H. Laws S.B. 180. The senate bill sought to establish a recovery fund for the victims 
of the Financial Resources Mortgage fraud, in which 150 investors lost $33 million in 2009. See 
Garry Rayno, Ponzi Scheme Victims May Recoup Some of Their Losses, N.H. UNION LEADER (Mar. 
28, 2013), http://www.unionleader.com/article/20130329/NEWS03/130328991 [https://perma.cc/ 
5V3B-XMR2]. Those opposed to the measure argued it would set a bad precedent and the money 
could go to other state expenditures. Id. The measure was rejected by the House in 2014. See Garry 
Rayno, FRM Scandal Recovery Fund Tabled by NH House, N.H. UNION LEADER (Jan. 16, 2014), 
 
05 - Berdejo.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/28/2017  1:51 PM 
2017] SMALL INVESTMENTS, BIG LOSSES 609 
 
2. Policy Framework for Assessing Restitution Funds 
From an injured investor’s perspective, the restitution funds 
established by Montana and Indiana address many of the limitations of 
Florida’s SGF.226 First, investors may bring claims relating to securities 
violations committed by any person, not just dealers and advisors.
227
 
Second, investors do not need to first file a civil lawsuit and obtain a 
judgment to be eligible—an administrative order or a court order in an 
action brought by the securities administrator will suffice.
228
 This is 
quite important as most, if not all, investors in small transactions may 
not find it economically viable to bring a lawsuit in the first place.
229
 
Finally, the caps on the amount recoverable by investors under both the 
Indiana and Montana programs are higher than that of Florida’s SGF.230 
Overall, this new generation of investor compensation programs 
appears to provide greater protection for investors by increasing their 
chances of receiving at least partial compensation. Of course, a program 
that merely maximizes the expected compensation received by injured 
investors is not necessarily desirable or optimal from society’s 
perspective. Two comparable initiatives—securities fraud insurance and 
crime victim compensation funds—provide an analytical framework 
with which to assess the policy justifications and social welfare 
implications of these securities fraud restitution programs. 
a. Restitution Funds as Insurance Against Fraud 
The securities restitution funds closely resemble investor 
misinformation (or securities fraud) insurance programs that have been 
proposed by scholars to supplement or replace securities class actions.
231
 
                                                     
http://www.unionleader.com/article/20140116/NEWS06/140119472 [https://perma.cc/8TQ5-
HH5L]. 
226. See supra notes 201 and accompanying text. 
227. See supra notes 203, 215 and accompanying text. 
228. See supra notes 204, 214 and accompanying text. 
229. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
230. See supra notes 208, 217 and accompanying text. 
231. See David Skeel, ICARUS IN THE BOARDROOM: THE FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS IN CORPORATE 
AMERICA AND WHERE THEY CAME FROM 214 (2005) (proposing an optional federal insurance fund 
to provide compensation for shareholder losses stemming from corporate fraud); Lawrence A. 
Cunningham, Choosing Gatekeepers: The Financial Statement Insurance Alternative to Auditor 
Liability, 52 UCLA L. REV. 413, 415–17 (2004) (proposing a similar insurance program for fraud 
related to financial statements); Evans, supra note 74, at 241–57 (proposing an investor 
compensation fund that would make award to victims of securities fraud); Joshua Ronen, Post-
Enron Reform: Financial Statement Insurance, and GAAP Re-visited, 8 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 39, 
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Although the specifics of these proposals differ,
232
 they all are grounded 
on the shortcomings of private securities litigation and public 
enforcement in achieving the goals of deterring fraud and compensating 
its victims.
233
 The main criticisms of these insurance schemes relate to 
their effect on investor behavior: namely, that investors can protect 
themselves more efficiently against fraud (e.g., by diversifying),
234
 and 
that insuring investors against fraud can lead to suboptimal investment 
decisions (e.g., moral hazard).
235




Critics of these fraud insurance schemes note that investors can easily 
eliminate the risk of fraud by just owning stock in several companies 
(i.e., by diversifying their portfolios).
237
 A brief example illustrates this 
point. Assume that an ongoing fraud is inflating the market price of the 
stock of a company by $5 (i.e., so that the price of the stock would drop 
by $5 if the truth was revealed). Investor A, a holder of the stock, sells it 
to investor B at market price. In this particular transaction, investor A is 
a winner and investor B is a loser (i.e., A sold B inflated stock). 
However, in other transactions investor B may end up on the winning 
side of the deal, selling a security at an artificially high price or buying 
at an artificially low price. If the probability of being in the losing or 
winning side is random, then an investor is as likely to gain or lose by 
                                                     
48–61 (2002) (proposing a mandatory financial statement insurance system to compensate 
shareholders from losses stemming from financial statement misrepresentations). 
232. For example, Evans’s proposed Investor Compensation Fund (ICF) would be administered 
by the SEC and funded by a mandatory fee collected by exchanges in transactions involving 
publicly-traded stock. See Evans, supra note 74, at 241–42. If a threshold number of shareholders 
complain or the SEC enforcement division brings charges against an issuer, the ICF would then 
conduct an investigation and make damage awards determinations employing administrative style 
proceedings. See id. at 246–47. 
233. See supra section I.A.1; Tom Baker, Insurance Against Misinformation in the Securities 
Market, in TASK FORCE TO MODERNIZE SECURITIES LEGISLATION IN CANADA 373 (June 5, 2006) 
(arguing that the market addresses the risk of investment losses due to misinformation by securities 
litigation, public enforcement, and diversification by investors); John C. Coffee, supra note 72, at 
1538 (noting that securities class actions have two main policy goals: compensation and 
deterrence).  
234. See infra notes 23748 and accompanying text. 
235. See infra notes 24953 and accompanying text. 
236. See infra notes 25456 and accompanying text. 
237. See, e.g., Sean J. Griffith, Daedalean Tinkering, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1247, 1257 (2006) 
(arguing that losses guaranteed under Skeel’s investor protection program are capable of being 
spread without cost by holding a diversified portfolio). 
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fraud and, on average, if the investor holds enough stock in different 
companies, the gains and losses should balance out.
238
 
This idea can be more rigorously articulated by reference to modern 
portfolio and asset pricing theory, which divides risk into two types—
idiosyncratic (or firm specific) risk and systemic (or market) risk.
239
 
Because an investor can nearly eliminate the idiosyncratic risk 
associated with owning a security through diversification, the market 
only compensates investors for the market (or undiversifiable) risk they 
bear.
240
 If the risk of fraud is just like any other ordinary idiosyncratic 
risk that can be easily eliminated via diversification,
241
 then investors 
will not be compensated for bearing that risk and thus rational investors 
will just diversify their portfolios to deal with this problem.
242
 
Though persuasive in theory, the diversification argument has little 
purchase in the context of small-scale securities fraud.
243
 An underlying 
assumption of this critique is that fraud occurs after the securities have 
been sold by the issuer to public investors and that insiders are not 
involved in the trade (i.e., purely secondary market fraud).
244
 This 
                                                     
238. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 STAN. L. 
REV. 1487, 1502 (1996); Richard A. Booth, Class Conflict in Securities Fraud Litigation, 14 U. PA. 
J. BUS. L. 701, 706 (2012) (“[A] diversified investor is effectively insured against securities 
fraud.”); Richard A. Booth, The End of the Securities Fraud Class Action as We Know It, 4 
BERKELEY BUS. L. J. 1, 7 (2007) (“A diversified investor is equally likely to be on the winning side 
of a given trade as on the losing side. Thus, a diversified investor is already effectively protected 
against securities fraud in most cases.”). 
239. See Evans, supra note 74, at 227–28. 
240. See Booth, Class Conflict in Securities Fraud Litigation, supra note 238, at 712 (“An 
undiversified investor assumes unnecessary risk for the same expected return that diversified 
investors enjoy.”). Existing studies indicate a portfolio containing as few as twenty stocks can 
eliminate more than ninety-nine percent of firm-specific risk. See Franco Modigliani & Gerald A. 
Pogue, An Introduction to Risk and Return: Concepts and Evidence, 30 FIN. ANAL. J. 68, 74–75 
(1974) (finding that a portfolio of twenty stocks can essentially eliminate company specific risk). 
241. See Booth, The End of the Securities Class Action as We Know It, supra note 238, at 13 
(arguing that the risk of simple securities fraud is like any other ordinary business risk). 
242. See id. at 7 (“Through diversification, an investor can avoid significant company-specific 
risk without any reduction in return and can do so at no cost. Because it is irrational to assume more 
risk than necessary, it follows that rational investors diversify.”); Pritchard, supra note 72, at 946 
(“[C]ompensation [in the form of securities class actions] as a form of insurance makes little sense 
if the victim of fraud can avoid the risk at a lower cost.”). 
243. Some scholars are skeptical of this argument even in cases involving secondary market 
fraud. See, e.g., Booth, The End of the Securities Class Action as We Know It, supra note 238, at 5 
(arguing that if the price declines not just to where it would be in absence of fraud but goes lower 
due to uncertainty, then losses to investors exceed their gains and investors on average lose on 
account of fraud); Evans, supra note 74, at 229. 
244. See Booth, The End of the Securities Class Action as We Know It, supra note 238, at 9 
(“Diversified investors suffer no harm from securities fraud except in those cases in which insider 
trading subtracts wealth from the market.”); John C. Coffee,  supra note 72, at 1537 (“In the typical 
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assumption is what allows investors to sometimes end up on the winning 
side of the transaction.
245
 However, in the context of the small-scale 
fraud that is the subject of this Article, the fraud often occurs when the 
issuer or the promoter sells the security to investors. One could argue 
that the risk of fraud associated with acquiring illiquid securities from a 
promoter in a small offering can still be partially diversified by holding a 
portfolio that is heavily weighted toward securities listed on a national 
exchange and purchased in the secondary market. But here, we 
encounter another problematic assumption of the diversification 
argument: investors will diversify because it is rational to do so.
246
 
Existing empirical evidence strongly suggests that investors do not 
diversify,
247
 a phenomenon that can be attributed to a number of 
factors.
248
 To the extent that financial sophistication and diversification 
are correlated, it would not be surprising to find that victims of small-
scale fraud are not diversified. 
A second economic critique of fraud insurance schemes centers 
around the problem of moral hazard—once individuals are insured 
against a risk, they have less incentive to avoid or reduce the loss 
associated with that risk.
249
 In other words, having insurance against 
fraud may reduce the incentive of investors to avoid investing in 
securities that pose higher risk and, as a result, investors may be less 
careful and take socially undesirable risks that they would otherwise 
have not taken in the absence of insurance.
250
 The problem of moral 
hazard is not trivial or theoretical—according to some scholars, moral 
                                                     
secondary market case, the corporation is not selling its securities and thus does not receive any 
‘direct benefit’ . . . when its managers inflate its earnings and stock price.”).  
245. See Pritchard, supra note 72, at 945–46 (“If fraud on the market can, for the most part, be 
diversified away, investors’ losses from trades affected by that fraud are not really a social cost.”). 
246. See Booth, The End of the Securities Class Action as We Know It, supra note 238, at 11–12 
(arguing that if investors can diversify away risk of fraud, then it is rational for them to do so; and 
the law should only protect reasonable investors); Evans, supra note 74, at 230. 
247. See Evans, supra note 74, at 234 (citing evidence from the survey of consumer finances 
published by the Federal Reserve which finds that almost sixty percent of individual investors hold 
stock in three or fewer companies and thirty-five percent hold just in one). 
248. See id. at 235 n.50 (noting the reasons explaining this lack of diversification, which include 
an illusory sense of control stemming from direct involvement in the investment process and 
gambling tendencies, among others). 
249. A classic account of the economic theory behind the moral hazard problem is presented in 
Bengt Holmström, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 BELL J. ECON. 74 (Spring 1979). For an 
overview of the role of moral hazard in the law, see Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral 
Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237 (1996); TOM BAKER, INSURANCE LAW & POLICY: CASES, MATERIALS 
AND PROBLEMS 48 (2003) (discussing moral hazard). 
250. See Baker, supra note 233, at 381; Griffith, supra note 237, at 1256 (arguing that fraud 
insurance schemes will lead investors to take on more risk).  
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Insurance markets have devised a number of mechanisms to minimize 
the impact of moral hazard by providing adequate incentives for the 
insured to take precautions to prevent harm from occurring. Insurance 
contracts achieve this by providing only partial coverage for an insured’s 
losses (i.e., requiring the insured to share part of the loss) via deductibles 
(i.e., a baseline amount of the loss that must be absorbed by the 
individual), copayments (i.e., a percentage of the loss above the 
deductible that is not covered), and coverage limits (i.e., capping the 
amount of losses that are recoverable).
252
 As discussed later in this 
Article, the securities restitution funds have features that mimic these 
mechanisms, providing some reassurance that moral hazard will not lead 
to an unraveling of these programs.
253
 
The final set of concerns highlighted by critics of the securities fraud 
insurance schemes are fiscal in nature—the associated costs and the 
manner the programs are funded. Effectively administering these 
insurance schemes is likely to consume significant monetary and human 
resources, and if the costs are high enough, they may effectively offset 
any relative benefits associated with the insurance programs.
254
 In 
addition, there are opportunity costs and distributional concerns as 
well.
255
 The relevance of these fiscal and distributional issues in the 




                                                     
251. See Griffith, supra note 237, at 1256 (drawing a comparison between the moral hazard that 
would be created by securities fraud insurance and the moral hazard problems created by deposit 
insurance regimes that led to the savings and loan crisis of the mid 1980s); Geoffrey P. Miller, 
Banking Regulation: The Future of the Dual Banking System, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 19 (1987) 
(explaining that deposit insurance creates moral hazard by giving banks the incentive to take 
excessive risks because they capture the benefits while the costs are borne by the insurance fund); 
Kenneth E. Scott, Never Again: The S&L Bailout Bill, 45 BUS. LAW. 1883, 1898 (1990) (“The 
magnitude of [the FDIC and FSLIC losses] . . . was occasioned by a literal explosion of . . . moral 
hazard.”). 
252. See generally Ronen Avrahama, The Economics of Insurance Law – A Primer, 19 CONN. 
INS. L. J. 30 (2012), 70–71 (describing various contractual solutions to the moral hazard problem in 
the insurance context). In addition, insurance companies obtain subrogation rights, which allow the 
insurer to seek redress from responsible parties. Id. at 81. 
253. See infra notes 27175 and accompanying text. 
254. See Griffith, supra note 237, at 1255–56 (criticizing an existing investor compensation 
scheme proposal “based on administrability and cost”). 
255. See id. at 1256. 
256. See infra section II.B.3.b. 
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b. Restitution Funds as a Crime Victim Compensation Fund 
The securities restitution funds also share some features with crime 
victim compensation programs.
257
 Generally, to be eligible under these 
compensation programs, an individual must have been a victim of a 
violent crime and suffered bodily injury or death.
258
 In addition, the 
victim must facilitate law enforcement’s prosecution efforts by reporting 
the crime promptly and cooperating with police and prosecutors.
259
 
Qualifying victims may be compensated for certain eligible expenses 
related to the criminal injury.
260
 However, the total available award is 
often capped (with the maximum varying by state),
261
 and in some states 
eligibility is conditioned on financial need.
262
 Victim compensation 
programs are predominantly financed by criminal fines and penalties, 
                                                     
257. For an overview of how victim compensation programs work, see generally Crime Victim 
Compensation: An Overview, NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIME VICTIM COMPENSATION BOARDS, 
http://www.nacvcb.org/index.asp?bid=14 [https://perma.cc/J5U5-X8VM]; SUSAN HERMAN AND 
MUCHELLE WAUL, NAT’L. CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, REPAIRING THE HARM: A NEW VISION FOR 
CRIME VICTIM COMPENSATION IN AMERICA 1932 (July 2004), https://victimsofcrime.org/ 
docs/Comp%20Roundtable/Repairing%20the%20Harm%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/DKY5-
YNW5]. Today, all fifty states operate a victim compensation program. See OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF 
CRIME, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NEW DIRECTIONS FROM THE FIELD: CRIME VICTIM COMPENSATION, 
NCJ 170600, at 325 (1998), https://www.ncjrs.gov/ovc_archives/directions/pdftxt/chap14.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/B3TX-V6F3]. At the federal level, the Victims of Crime Act of 1984 (VOCA) 
provides compensation to victims of federal crimes and grants to the states that operate qualifying 
victim compensation programs. Victims of Crime Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 
2170 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 10601110605 (2012)).  
258. See, e.g., IND. CODE §§ 5-2-6.1-7, 5-2-6.1-8 (2015). Violent crimes generally include felony 
or Class A misdemeanors that result in bodily injury or death to the victim. Id.; see also OR. REV. 
STAT. §§ 147.005(4), (15) (2015); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 53-9-103(3), (5) (2015); WASH. REV. 
CODE §§ 7.68.020(5), (15) (2016); FLA. STAT. §§ 960.03(3), (14) (2016); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 17-15-
2(3), 17-15-7(a)(1) (2016); 42 U.S.C. § 10602(b)(1) (2012) (defining eligibility criteria for states to 
receive federal grants to fund their victim compensation programs). 
259. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 10602(b)(2) (requiring programs to promote cooperation with law 
enforcement). 
260. Eligible expenses commonly include medical care, mental health treatment, funerals, and 
lost wages, among others. See Crime Victim Compensation: An Overview, supra note 257; HERMAN 
AND WAUL, supra note 257, at 21.  
261. All states cap monetary recovery at amounts ranging from $5,000 to $180,000, with an 
average cap of approximately $35,000; in 2001, the median award nationally was $2,400. See Julie 
Goldscheid, Crime Victim Compensation in a Post-9/11 World, 79 TUL. L. REV. 167, 190 (2004). 
For example, in Indiana, the maximum award under the victim compensation program is $15,000, 
which coincides with the maximum award under the investor restitution fund. IND. CODE § 5-2-6.1-
35(a)(1). 
262. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 960.13(8); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-7305(d) (2016); KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 346.140(3) (2016); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 18.361(7) (2016); and N.Y. EXEC. LAW 
§ 631(6)(a) (2016).  
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federal Victims of Crime Act of 1984 (VOCA) grants and, in a few 
states, general revenue funds.
263
 
Several rationales have been offered in support of victim 
compensation programs.
264
 The first set of justifications relates to the 
state’s obligation to maintain safety and security. Because the 
maintenance of safety and security is a public good provided by the 
state, when someone falls prey to a violent crime, the state has failed and 
thus must compensate the victim.
265
 Crime victim compensation 
programs serve as a way of distributing the costs of crime across 
society—i.e., as a system of public insurance that covers a risk (crime) 
to which all citizens in a society are exposed and thus helps spread the 
losses that result from that risk by compensating victims and enhancing 
social welfare.
266
 This first set of justifications for victim compensation 
programs is not persuasive in the context of securities fraud. 
A second set of justifications suggests that victim compensation 
programs may also have a deterrent effect by increasing the size of the 
penalty paid by criminals and their probability of being detected, 
potentially playing a role in reducing crime.
267
 To the extent that 
                                                     
263. See HERMAN AND WAUL, supra note 257, at 23. State compensation programs that meet 
certain criteria are eligible to receive federal VOCA grants, which are also funded by federal 
criminal fines and penalties. 42 U.S.C. §§ 10602(a)-(b)(6), 10601(b).  
264. See Goldscheid, supra note 261, at 212 (organizing these rationales into four groups: legal 
obligation, social welfare, shared risks, and support to the criminal justice system). 
265. See, e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, POLITICAL REMEDIES FOR THE EVIL OF OFFENSES (1838), 
reprinted in CONSIDERING THE VICTIM 29–42 (Joe Hudson & Burt Galaway eds., 1975) (arguing 
that the community ought to be taxed to repair the damage caused because it bears responsibility for 
violent offenses); Robert D. Childres, Compensation for Criminally Inflicted Personal Injury, 39 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 444, 455–56 (1964) (arguing that aside from the criminal, the state is the party “next 
most responsible” for the crime); Margery Fry, Justice for Victims, 8 J. PUB. L. 191, 191–92 (1959) 
(arguing that society’s “collective responsibility for sickness and injury” and its “modern” systems 
of sharing the cost of social risks warrants public provision of assistance for victims); Arthur J. 
Goldberg, Equality and Governmental Action, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 205, 224–25 (1964) (arguing that 
government should compensate crime victims because crime reflects society’s inattention to poverty 
and social injustice). 
266. See Fry, supra note 265, at 192–93. See also Bentham, supra note 265, at 39 (arguing that 
while the best source of compensation for losses resulting from crime is the offender, the cost of 
losses that the offender cannot pay should be borne by the state because “it is an object of public 
benefit; the security of all is concerned”); Childres, supra note 265, at 457–59 (referencing the 
failure of private insurance in the workers’ compensation context to conclude that victim 
compensation should be funded by the state).  
267. See Philip J. Cook & John MacDonald, The Role of Private Action in Controlling Crime, in 
CONTROLLING CRIME: STRATEGIES AND TRADEOFFS 349–51 (2011) (discussing how victim 
compensation programs can, in conjunction with other programs, enhance deterrence by increasing 
cooperation by victims); Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. 
POL. ECON. 169, 176–79 (1968) (modelling criminal behavior as a balancing of the benefits of a 
crime against the probability of being detected and the penalties imposed upon detection); Gary S. 
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defendant fines and fees comprise funds used to pay victims, the size of 
the penalty paid by criminals is increased. However, it is hard to imagine 
that these additional monetary amounts recovered through 
supplementary fines, fees, and restitution would be substantial enough to 
effect any marginal change in offender behavior. But even if the amount 
of the penalty (conditional on conviction) remains relatively unchanged, 
the probability of detection and conviction of criminals may be increased 
if victims are more likely to come forward and cooperate with law 
enforcement officials, knowing that they may receive some sort of 
monetary compensation.
268 
Whether compensation programs can in 
practice achieve this goal is an open question, given the limited size of 
the awards received by victims under these programs.
269
 This second set 
of justifications for victim compensation programs appears more 
compelling in the context of securities fraud, and its implications will be 
discussed in more detail later in this Article.
270
 
3. An Economic Assessment of Securities Restitution Funds 
a. Effect on Investor Behavior 
i. Moral Hazard: Will Investors Be More Likely to Take 
Unnecessary Risks? 
Even though the securities restitution funds are not technically 
insurance programs, they arguably raise moral hazard concerns in a 
manner that victim compensation programs do not.
271
 One may worry 
                                                     
Becker & George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and the Compensation of Enforcers, 3 
J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1974) (“Enforcement is generally more effective against violations with 
victims because victims have a stake in apprehending violators, especially when they receive 
restitution.”). 
268. The congressional findings accompanying the final version of VOCA highlighted 
Congress’s hope that the compensation program would promote victim cooperation. The Victims of 
Crime Assistance Act of 1984: Hearing on S.2423 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th 
Cong. 9–10 (1984). 
269. See, e.g., Charlene L. Smith, Victim Compensation: Hard Questions and Suggested 
Remedies, 17 RUTGERS L.J. 51, 69–70 (1985) (arguing that economic incentives do not appear to 
provide adequate incentives for victims to cooperate); Goldscheid, supra note 261, at 217 (noting 
that “the modest amount of available awards and the relative lack of awareness of the programs 
among victims” may explain why programs may not have a “substantial impact on victims’ 
willingness to cooperate with law enforcement”). These type of problems could similarly hinder the 
potential effectiveness of securities restitution funds. 
270. See infra section II.B.3.a(2). 
271. This is in part due to the non-monetary nature of the victim’s loss in the latter. Would 
someone take fewer precautions because of the prospect of partially recovering some of the 
monetary losses associated with a crime? 
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that investors who are aware of the existence of a securities fraud 
restitution program may take unnecessary risks (or risks they would not 
otherwise take) in search of a high return by investing in speculative and 
dubious investments, knowing that if things turn out well they will earn 
a high return but that if things do not they are likely to receive some 
partial recovery from the fund. In the context of small, private securities 
offerings, moral hazard can present greater concerns relative to 
transactions in the public secondary markets. Providing incentives to 
investors to protect themselves against fraud in the public markets (e.g., 
by double-checking and fact-checking companies’ reports and regulatory 
filings) could result in wasteful and duplicative expenditures. However, 
in the smaller, private transactions that are the subject of this Article, 
society may prefer investors to be more skeptical and carefully conduct 
adequate research to protect themselves before purchasing securities. 
In practice, however, moral hazard is unlikely to pose a significant 
problem in this context. First, for moral hazard to become a concern, you 
need individuals to be aware of the terms of the restitution programs 
beforehand and be somewhat certain that they will have a right to 
recover from the fund. Moreover, as noted earlier, the insurance market 
minimizes the impact of moral hazard on individual behavior by making 




As designed, the Montana and Indiana restitution funds possess all 
these mechanisms. Prior to bringing a claim, an investor must have a 
judgment against the individual who violated the securities laws and 
must show that such judgment cannot be satisfied.
273
 Thus, the investor 
must either bring a lawsuit against the violator or convince the securities 
administrator to bring a civil or administrative action against the 
perpetrator and cooperate with such investigation. Requiring the investor 
to make these monetary and non-monetary outlays prior to bringing a 
claim against the fund serves as the functional equivalent of a 
deductible. And, even after the investor properly files a claim against the 
restitution fund, the investor is only entitled to partial recovery and will 
have to absorb a substantial portion of the losses. In Montana, for 
example, the investor must bear twenty-five percent of his or her losses 
up to $100,000 and 100 percent of the losses beyond that (as the 
maximum recovery is $25,000).
274
 And, in Indiana, investors seeking 
                                                     
272. See supra note 252 and accompanying text. 
273. See supra notes 207, 214 and accompanying text. 
274. See supra notes 214–17 and accompanying text. 
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compensation still have to bear twenty-five percent of their losses up to 
$60,000 and 100 percent of the losses after that (as the maximum 
recovery is $15,000).
275
 It thus seems unlikely that recovery under these 
programs will incentivize investors to undertake excessive risk.
276
 
ii. Enhanced Cooperation of Fraud Victims with Securities 
Administrators 
By providing monetary incentives to encourage injured investors to 
come forward and notify the securities administrators of a securities law 
violation, restitution programs may affect investor behavior in a manner 
that is desirable from society’s perspective. As noted earlier, in securities 
fraud cases involving small monetary amounts, investors may not have 
the incentive to bring a lawsuit.
277
 This is an undesirable outcome as 
there are positive externalities associated with private securities fraud 
lawsuits. For example, by increasing the expected penalties for 
fraudsters, lawsuits serve a deterrent effect. In addition, the filing of a 
private lawsuit can also alert the securities administrator, who can then 
investigate and further penalize the securities violator. 
As is the case with many activities that produce positive externalities, 
investors may not bring lawsuits or file complaints at a socially desirable 
                                                     
275. See supra notes 203–08 and accompanying text. 
276. To place these recovery amounts in perspective, we can compare these to the actual losses 
suffered by investors in these fraudulent schemes. As noted earlier, the first payment from the 
Indiana Securities Restitution Fund, in the amount of $15,000, was awarded to an investor who had 
lost $400,000. See supra note 211. On February 2015, several Indiana investors who lost their life 
savings in a series of Ponzi schemes received restitution payments from the fund. See Press Release, 
Ind. Sec. State, Secretary Lawson Awards Over $150,000 in Securities Restitution Funds to 14 
Hoosier Investors Robbed of Retirement (Feb. 17, 2015), http://www.in.gov/activecalendar/ 
EventList.aspx?type=public&eventidn=209051&view=EventDetails&information_id=211275&prin
t=print [https://perma.cc/J5N3-ACQM]. In one of these schemes, thirty investors lost $1.4 million 
(about $46,666 on average). See Press Release, Ind. Sec. State, Indianapolis Man Sentenced to 10 
Years for Running a Ponzi Scheme (Oct. 22, 2014), http://www.in.gov/activecalendar/ 
EventList.aspx?view=EventDetails&eventidn=190303&information_id=207219 
[https://perma.cc/N6ND-J6EY]. More recently, the Indiana fund made restitution payments to a 
number of investors who were victims in a real estate development fraudulent scheme. See Press 
Release, Ind. Sec. State, Victims of Securities Fraud Receive $62,500 in Restitution Fund Awards 
from the Indiana Secretary of State’s Office Made Possible by the Secretary of State’s Securities 
Restitution Fund (Nov. 17, 2016), http://www.in.gov/activecalendar/EventList.aspx?public& 
eventidn=254286&view=EventDetails&information_id=252912&print=print [https://perma.cc/A5 
7M-HTLF]. In this scheme thirty-six investors lost $2.18 million (an average of just over $60,000). 
See Bob Kasarda, Pair Ordered to Pay Back $2.1 Million in Porter County Investment Scam, THE 
TIMES OF NORTHWEST INDIANA (Sept. 26, 2016), http://www.nwitimes.com/news/local/porter/pair-
ordered-to-pay-back-million-in-porter-county-investment/article_865630f1-376b-5c9d-90eb-
a35d3afd1f5a.html [https://perma.cc/YP5G-EYJ4]. 
277. See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text. 
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level if in doing so they have to bear the costs (monetary and otherwise) 
without receiving a sufficiently large benefit in return, even if the social 
benefits of their actions would far outweigh their private costs.
278
 By 
providing investors a larger return to filing a lawsuit in court or a 
complaint with state securities regulators, restitution programs may align 
private and social interests and enhance the deterrent effects of the 
securities laws. Such effect on investor behavior would certainly be 
greater in those states that also allow the securities administrator to order 
restitution on behalf of the investor at the conclusion of an 
administrative action, as the upfront costs for the investor are lower. 
b. Fiscal, Monetary, and Distributional Concerns 
i. Are Securities Restitution Funds Too Small to Meet Their 
Goal? 
One concern is whether the amounts that investors may recover from 
the funds are large enough to compensate investors and encourage them 
to assist securities administrators in the detection and investigation of 
securities fraud. Consider an investor who lost $40,000. Under either the 
Montana or Indiana program, the maximum recovery for this investor 
would be $10,000 (i.e., twenty-five percent of the investor’s losses).279 
Certainly, $10,000 is much less than $40,000, and one wonders to what 
extent the investor will be able to recover financially from the 
unfortunate event. Moreover, if the amounts that an investor can recover 
from the fund are not large enough, the investor may not have the 
incentive to pursue a case in court or cooperate with the securities 
administrator. This problem is amplified by the fact that the partial 
recovery of $10,000 is uncertain (e.g., the action may be unsuccessful or 
the fund may run out of money), further reducing the expected 
compensation for the investor. 
There are some obvious problems with granting larger awards. 
Providing investors with higher levels of compensation may exacerbate 
the moral hazard problem outlined earlier. Though this may be true for 
any increases in the percentage of losses that may be recoverable and for 
the savvier investors, it is not clear whether increasing the maximum cap 
(currently $25,000 in Montana and $15,000 in Indiana) would have such 
                                                     
278. See Michael D. Guttentag, An Argument for Imposing Disclosure Requirements on Public 
Companies, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 123, 155–58 (2004) (providing an illustration of the under-
provision of activities with positive externalities). 
279. See supra notes 208, 217 and accompanying text. 
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detrimental effects on investors’ ex ante behavior.280 A more pressing 
concern is that providing higher levels of compensation would demand 
more funding, as it would drain any available funds more quickly. 
Because the restitution funds are not financed with tax revenues, this is 
likely to result in shortfalls, leading to increasing delays and lower levels 
of compensation for injured investors.
281
 
One possible strategy that may allow for more sizable recovery 
amounts while avoiding budgetary shortfalls would be to have claims 
against the funds be means tested like some victim compensation 
programs.
282
 For example, one could imagine a system where only 
persons with income below a certain level may fully recover the 
maximum statutory amount. For those investors with annual incomes 
above this threshold, the amount that may be recovered from the fund 
would be phased out gradually. This system would promote one of the 
goals of the restitution funds—provide compensation to investors, 
particularly those less wealthy individuals, who are the ones more likely 
to be hurt by a small financial loss.
283
 The drawback, however, is that 
those individuals who cannot recover from the fund would have fewer 
monetary incentives to bring a lawsuit or alert the administrator to the 
securities fraud (though non-monetary factors such as quenching a thirst 
for revenge would still provide some incentives to report to the 
administrator).
284
 Eligibility could be based on non-monetary factors, 
such as membership in groups seen as easy targets by fraudsters. 
Montana has adopted a similar strategy by increasing the amount of 
money that may be recovered by “vulnerable” individuals (including, for 
example, senior citizens) to the lesser of $50,000 or fifty percent of the 
amount of unpaid restitution.
285
 
                                                     
280. Id. 
281. See supra notes 20910, 21920 and accompanying text. This concern likely led to 
Montana’s legislation which expanded the source of funding for the restitution programs a few 
years after its establishment. See supra note 220 and accompanying text. A fiscal note 
accompanying the Montana bill estimated that annual revenues from the additional funding sources 
would equal approximately $272,000. 
282. See supra notes 22829 and accompanying text. 
283. Moreover, to the extent these investors are less savvy, the impact of moral hazard on their 
behavior is likely to be relatively attenuated.  
284. This concern may be lessened if wealthier individuals have the resources and incentives to 
bring a private lawsuit regardless of their ability to recover from the fund. 
285. See supra note 218 and accompanying text. 
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ii. Opportunity Costs & Distributional Concerns 
In assessing the social welfare consequences of establishing a 
restitution fund, one must consider more than just the direct costs and 
benefits associated with such a program. In a world of limited and scarce 
resources, undertaking a new program sponsored and funded by the 
government often means that the state must reduce the size of other 
programs or maybe even abandon some programs altogether. This 
section considers two general types of programs that may be adversely 
impacted by the introduction of securities restitution funds: fraud 
prevention activities conducted by securities administrators and 
programs unrelated to the securities regulation area. 
If the funds devoted to a new restitution program would have 
remained within the administrative agency’s budget (instead of being 
remitted to the state’s general treasury), one may worry that the newly 
created funds would receive monies previously earmarked in the 
administrator’s budget for essential areas such as securities enforcement 
or investor education programs. To the extent that enforcement activities 
can generally result in the recovery of funds (via fines or settlements for 
example) for the administrator, one may not expect their levels to be 
affected by the introduction of the restitution programs. However, 
investor education programs, which are not revenue generating, may be 
adversely affected. 
In fact, many state securities administrators use investor education 
programs as part of their toolkit in combating fraud.
286
 These programs 
generally prepare informational materials and engage in outreach events 
(such as presentations) to teach individuals about investing strategies 
and how to avoid falling victim to fraud.
287
 Most of these programs, 
including Indiana’s, are funded in part by funds collected from 
settlements in securities fraud cases litigated by the securities 
administrators (i.e., those being partially diverted to restitution funds).
288
 
One may wonder whether the money diverted to the restitution funds 
should rather be invested in these types of preventive programs. 
Although these programs are certainly an important part of the securities 
administrators’ toolkits to combat fraud, their effectiveness is still an 
                                                     
286. See, e.g., Investor Education, NASAA, http://www.nasaa.org/investor-education 
[https://perma.cc/XP4P-QTLF] (“State . . . securities regulators have a long tradition of protecting 
investors through financial education.”). 
287. See Educational Outreach, IN.GOV, https://secure.in.gov/sos/securities/2421.htm [https:// 
perma.cc/M7N4-86TU] (describing Indiana’s investor education program).  
288. Id. 
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open question in light of the particular groups that are often victimized, 
and behavioral limitations in human decision-making.
289
 Though an 
assessment of alternative fraud-preventive programs relative to 
restitution funds is beyond the scope of this Article, it should be 
acknowledged that by adopting an investor restitution program, a state is 
affirmatively choosing among different strategies to combat fraud. 
If the amounts deposited in the restitution fund come from the state’s 
general fund or from a source that would have otherwise gone to the 
general fund, then the social calculus must also consider the opportunity 
costs of such a transfer (i.e., the alternative use of the money in the 
provision of other government programs that has been foregone) and the 
resulting distributional effects.
290
 This concern gains greater prominence 
in an age of budget deficits and cuts to education and health programs. 
As an illustration, we can briefly examine the general appropriations in 
Indiana’s 2016 budget.291 The two major components of this part of the 
state’s budget are K-12 education (forty-six percent) and Medicaid 
(thirteen percent).
292
 Arguably, a dollar spent to provide restitution to a 
defrauded investor is a dollar that cannot be spent on K-12 education, 
providing healthcare to those in need, etc. But determining the 
distributional effects certainly is not as easy as that. Perhaps this dollar 
(or a portion of it) would have stayed in the state administrator’s budget. 
Or even if it had gone to the general revenue, the dollar may have been 
spent in programs less commendable than K-12 education and health 
care for the poor. In any event, in addressing these distributional 
concerns, the identity of the securities restitution fund recipients also 
matters, as many of these (such as the elderly) may otherwise be the 
recipients of aid from the state. Ultimately, these are all issues for state 
legislatures to consider and weigh. But at the very least, these concerns 
                                                     
289. See, e.g., Jayne W. Barnard, Deception, Decisions, and Investor Education, 17 ELDER L. J. 
201, 20304 (2009) (question the effectiveness of financial education programs targeted at older 
adults, who are disproportionally victimized by fraudsters); Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial 
Literacy Education, 94 IOWA. L. REV. 197, 201 (2008) (“[F]inancial literacy is not sufficient for 
good financial decision-making; heuristics, biases, and emotional-coping mechanisms that at times 
interfere with welfare-enhancing personal-finance behaviors are unlikely to be eradicated through 
education, particularly in a dynamic market.”); Lauren E. Willis, The Financial Education Fallacy, 
101 AM. ECON. REV. 429, 43031 (2011) (arguing that behavioral biases reduce the effectiveness of 
financial education programs). 
290. This is a concern even for programs funded with fees obtained by the securities 
administrators from brokers and investment advisors. Generally, these funds are used to finance 
essential programs, offset funding shortfalls and remitted to the state’s general treasury. 
291. See Budget Information–FY 16 General Appropriations, IN.GOV: IND. TRANSPARENCY 
PORTAL, http://in.gov/itp/2340.htm [https://perma.cc/WJ96-H8XB]. 
292. Id. 
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stress once again the importance of considering some sort of means 
testing and lend additional support for a system that focuses on a 
vulnerable portion of the population.
293
 
c. Jurisdictional, Transactional, and Residency Requirements 
The long-term success of these investor restitution programs may be 
determined not just by the amount of the recovery provided to injured 
investors, but also by the strictness of their eligibility requirements. For 
example, Montana’s restitution program provides a higher maximum 
recovery than Indiana’s, but it is more restrictive in other key dimensions. 
First, Montana’s restitution fund only covers violations of Montana laws 
and regulations, while Indiana covers not only violations of Indiana laws 
and regulations, but of federal violations as well.
294
 Second, while an 
investor seeking to establish a claim against the restitution fund in Montana 
must have an order from the Montana securities commissioner or an order 
from a Montana court requested by the commissioner, Indiana only requires 
that the investor have a court order or an administrative order.
295
 Finally, 
while only Montana residents are eligible under that state’s restitution fund, 
Indiana provides coverage to non-resident investors from states that afford 
analogous protection to Indiana residents.
296
 
Having greater flexibility in jurisdictional, transactional, and residency 
requirements will likely make any single investor compensation program 
more expensive, as more investors will be able to file claims for restitution. 
However, more flexible requirements (such as those in Indiana’s program) 
could lead a more widespread adoption of these programs, as states seek to 
establish reciprocity with each other, and promote future cooperation on this 
front. Conceivably, one could envision states cooperating in administering 
common securities restitution funds, further spreading the risks and costs 




Although often overlooked in the academic literature and financial press, 
small-scale securities fraud can have devastating consequences for the most 
                                                     
293. See supra notes 28285 and accompanying text. 
294. See supra notes 203, 215 and accompanying text. 
295. See supra notes 204, 214 and accompanying text. 
296. See supra notes 20506, 216 and accompanying text.  
297. This parallels an earlier recommendation in this Article calling for increased cooperation 
among states in establishing and administering specialized administrative courts. See supra notes 
18284. 
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vulnerable of investors—those who may be more susceptible to becoming 
victims in the first place and who stand to lose a significant share of their 
life savings. Traditional enforcement mechanisms at the federal level often 
fail in these cases, making state law and enforcement indispensable. And 
with the continuing trend of deregulation at the federal level and an ever-
overburdened SEC, state regulators must assume an even greater role in 
protecting local investors. 
States are responding to this challenge, and this Article highlights two 
innovative strategies developed by different states to protect investors. The 
first, granting state securities administrators the power to order restitution on 
behalf of injured investors, has been slowly developing for decades and has 
by now been adopted by almost half the states. The second strategy, 
establishing restitution funds to assist investors in their recovery, is at a 
more nascent state and has only been fully implemented in two states. These 
two strategies can complement each other. An injured investor can notify 
the securities administrator of a securities violation; wait for the 
administrator to initiate administrative proceedings and order restitution; 
and then file for a claim against the fund if the violator does not satisfy the 
administrator’s order. 
These developments are without doubt encouraging, but there remains 
work to be done. More states should authorize their administrators to grant 
orders of restitution in cases involving securities fraud. Increased 
cooperation and coordination among the states in establishing and 
maintaining specialized administrative courts should facilitate this process. 
The securities restitution funds established in Indiana and Montana are 
novel and intriguing ideas. Whether these programs can be successful is an 
open question, but there is plenty of room for improvement and optimism. 
Adjusting the size of awards by imposing a “means-testing” on investor 
recovery could address both fiscal and behavioral concerns. Allowing out-
of-state investors to recover could lead to more widespread adoption of 
these programs and encourage cooperation among state securities 
administrators. 
Although these legislative advances appear to further the goals of 
compensating injured investors and deterring untoward behavior, they 
cannot be considered in a vacuum. This Article stressed the importance of 
understanding the effect of these strategies on the behavior of investors and 
administrators and how behavioral changes by these actors could have both 
positive and undesirable consequences. Gaining this understanding is 
critical for the design of successful programs and institutions that will both 
deter securities fraud and compensate its victims in a cost-effective manner. 
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Authority of Administrator to Request Restitution in a Civil Action 
or Order Restitution in an Administrative Action 
 






Alabama Yes No 
Alaska No No 
Arizona Yes Yes 
Arkansas Yes No 
California Yes Yes 
Colorado Yes No 
Connecticut Yes Yes 
Delaware Yes Yes 
Florida Yes No 
Georgia Yes No 
Hawaii Yes Yes 
Idaho Yes No 
Illinois Yes No 
Indiana Yes Yes 
Iowa Yes Yes 
Kansas Yes Yes 
Kentucky Yes No 
Louisiana No No 
Maine Yes Yes 
Maryland Yes No 
Massachusetts Yes Yes 
Michigan Yes No 
Minnesota Yes No 
Mississippi Yes Yes 
Missouri Yes Yes 
Montana Yes Yes 
Nebraska Yes No 
Nevada Yes No 
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Hampshire No Yes 
New Jersey Yes No 
New Mexico Yes No 
New York Yes No 
North 
Carolina Yes No 
North Dakota No Yes 
Ohio Yes No 
Oklahoma Yes No 
Oregon Yes Yes 
Pennsylvania Yes No 
Rhode Island Yes No 
South 
Carolina Yes No 
South Dakota Yes No 
Tennessee Yes No 
Texas Yes No 
Utah Yes No 
Vermont Yes Yes 
Virginia No Yes 
Washington Yes Yes 
West Virginia No No 
Wisconsin Yes Yes 
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Table 2: 
Authority of Administrator to Request Restitution in a Civil Action 
or Order Restitution in an Administrative Proceeding 
 
State Code Section Re: 
Civil Court 
Code Section Re: 
Administrative Actions 
Alabama ALA. CODE § 8-6-16(B) 
(2016) 
ALA. CODE § 8-6-19 
(2016) 
Alaska ALASKA STAT.   
§ 45.55.920(A) (2016) 
ALASKA STAT.  
§ 45.55.920(B) (2016) 
Arizona ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 44-2037(A) (2016) 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 44-2032(1) (2016) 
Arkansas ARK. CODE ANN.  
§ 23-42-20 (2016) 
ARK. CODE ANN.  
§ 23-42-20 (2016) 
California CAL. CORP. CODE § 25535 
(West 2016) 
CAL. CORP. CODE § 25532 
(West 2016) 
Colorado COLO. REV. STAT.  
§ 11-51-602 (2016) 
COLO. REV. STAT. 
§ 11-51-605 (2016) 
Connecticut CONN. GEN. STAT.  
§ 36B-27(E) (2016) 
CONN. GEN. STAT.  
§ 36B-27 (2016) 
Delaware DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 
73-602 (2016) 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6,  
§ 73-601 (2016) 
Florida FLA. STAT. § 517.191 
(2016) 
FLA. STAT. § 517.221 
(2016) 
Georgia GA. CODE ANN. § 10-5-72 
(2016) 
GA. CODE ANN. § 10-5-73 
(2016) 
Hawaii HAW. REV. STAT.  
§ 485A-603 (2016) 
HAW. REV. STAT. 
 § 485A-604 (2016) 
Idaho IDAHO CODE  
§ 30-14-603 (2016) 
IDAHO CODE  
§ 30-14-604 (2016) 
Illinois 815 ILL. COMP. STAT.  
§ 5/11 (I) (2016) 
815 ILL. COMP. STAT.  
 § 5/11 (2016) 
Indiana IND. CODE § 23-19-6-3 
(2016) 
IND. CODE § 23-19-6-4 
(2016) 
Iowa IOWA CODE § 502.603 
(2016) 
IOWA CODE § 502.604 
(2016) 
Kansas KAN. STAT. ANN.  
§ 17-12A603 (2016) 
KAN. STAT. ANN.  
§ 17-12A604 (2016) 
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State Code Section Re: 
Civil Court 
Code Section Re: 
Administrative Actions 
Kentucky KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 292.470(2) (West 2016) 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
292.5 (West 2016) 
Louisiana LA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 713(A)(2) (2016) 
LA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 713(A)(1) (2016) 
Maine ME. STAT. tit. 32,  
§ 16603 (2016) 
ME. STAT. tit. 32,  
§ 16604 (2016) 
Maryland MD. CODE CORP. ANN. & 
ASSOC. § 14–111 (West 
2016) 
MD. CODE, CORP. ANN. & 
ASSOC. § 14–210 (West 
2016) 
Massachusetts MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 
110A, § 408 (2016) 
MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 
110A, § 407A (2016) 
Michigan MICH. COMP. LAWS 
§ 451.2603 (2016) 
MICH. COMP. LAWS  
§ 451.2604 (2016) 
Minnesota MINN. STAT. § 80A.80 
(2016)  
MINN. STAT. § 80A.81 
(2016) 
Mississippi MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-71-
603 (2016) 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-
71-604 (2016) 
Missouri MO. REV. STAT. 
 § 409.6-603 (2016) 
MO. REV. STAT.  
§ 409.6-604 (2016) 
Montana MONT. CODE ANN.  
§ 30-10-305 (2016) 
MONT. CODE ANN.  
§ 30-10-305 (2016) 
Nebraska NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-1116 
(2016) 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-1115 
(2016) 
Nevada NEV. REV. STAT. § 90.640 
(2016) 




N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 421-B:6-603(B) (2016) 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 421-B:6-604(E) (2016) 
New Jersey N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:3-69 
(West 2016) 
N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 49:3-68.1 (West 2016) 
New Mexico N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-
13C-603 (2016) 
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-
13C-604 (2016) 
New York N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 353 
(McKinney 2016) 
N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW  
§ 23-A (2016 McKinney) 
North Carolina N.C. GEN. STAT.  
§ 78A-47(A) (2016) 
N.C. GEN. STAT.  
§ 78A-47(B) (2016) 
North Dakota N.D. CENT. CODE  
§ 10-04-16 (2016) 
N.D. CENT. CODE  
§ 10-04-16(1) (2016) 
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State Code Section Re: 
Civil Court 
Code Section Re: 
Administrative Actions 
Ohio OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 1707.261 (West 2016) 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 1707.23 (West 2016) 
Oklahoma OKLA. STAT. tit. 71,  
§ 1-603 (2016) 
OKLA. STAT. tit. 71,  
§ 1-604 (2016) 
Oregon OR. REV. STAT. §§ 59.331 
(2016) 
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 59.245 
(2016) 
Pennsylvania 70 PA. CONS. STAT.  
§ 1-509(A) (2016) 
70 PA. CONS. STAT.  
§ 1-606 (2016) 
Rhode Island R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-11-603 
(2016)  
R.I. GEN. LAWS  
§ 7-11-602 (2016) 
South Carolina S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1-
603 (2016) 
S.C. CODE ANN.  
§ 35-1-604 (2016) 
South Dakota S.D. CODIFIED LAWS  
§ 47-31B-603 (2016) 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS  
§ 47-31B-604 (2016) 
Tennessee TENN. CODE. ANN.  
§ 48-1-119 (2016) 
TENN. CODE. ANN.  
§ 48-1-116 (2016) 
Texas TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. 
ANN. § 32 (West 2016) 
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. 
ANN. § 23 (West 2016) 
Utah UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-
20(2) (West 2016) 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-
20 (West 2016) 
Vermont VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9,  
§ 5603 (2016) 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9,  
§ 5604(D) (2016) 
Virginia VA. CODE ANN.  
§ 13.1-520.1 (2016) 
VA. CODE ANN.  
§ 13.1-521 (2016) 
Washington WASH. REV. CODE  
§ 21.20.390 (2016) 
WASH. REV. CODE  
§ 21.20.390, 395 (2016) 
West Virginia W. VA. CODE § 32-4-408 
(2016) 
W. VA. CODE § 32-4-407A 
(2016) 
Wisconsin WIS. STAT. §551.603(3) 
(2016) 
WIS. STAT. § 551.604 
(2016) 
Wyoming WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-4-
120 (2016) 
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-4-
124(F) (2016) 
 
 
